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ARTICLE 
THE OBSERVER EFFECT:  NATIONAL SECURITY 
LITIGATION, EXECUTIVE POLICY CHANGES, 
AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
Ashley S. Deeks* 
 
The national security deference debate has reached a stalemate.  Those 
favoring extensive deference to executive branch national security decisions 
celebrate the limited role courts have played in reviewing those policies.  
The executive, they contend, is constitutionally charged with such decisions 
and structurally better suited than the judiciary to make them.  Those who 
bemoan such deference fear for individual rights and an imbalance in the 
separation of powers.  Yet both sides assume that the courts’ role is 
minimal.  Both sides are wrong. 
This Article shows why.  While courts rarely intervene in national 
security disputes, the Article demonstrates that they nevertheless play a 
significant role in shaping executive branch security policies.  Call this the 
“observer effect.”  Physics teaches us that observing a particle alters how 
it behaves.  Through psychology, we know that people act differently when 
they are aware that someone is watching them.  In the national security 
context, the executive is highly sensitive to looming judicial oversight in the 
national security arena, and establishes or alters policies in an effort to 
avert direct judicial involvement.  By identifying and analyzing the observer 
effect, this Article provides a more accurate positive account of national 
security deference, without which reasoned normative judgments cannot be 
made.  This Article makes another contribution to the literature as well.  By 
illustrating how the uncertain, but lurking, threat of judicial decisions spurs 
increasingly rights-protective policy decisions by the executive, it poses a 
rejoinder to those who are skeptical that law constrains the executive. 
 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School.  Thanks to Kate Andrias, 
Sarah Cleveland, Bobby Chesney, Jennifer Daskal, Rebecca Ingber, David Luban, David 
Martin, Trevor Morrison, Vijay Padmanabhan, Deborah Pearlstein, David Pozen, Rich 
Schragger, Paul Stephan, and participants in the 2012 National Security Law Faculty 
Workshop, the 2013 Potomac National Security Roundtable at George Washington 
University Law School, and a faculty workshop at Washington & Lee Law School for their 
helpful comments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the core tenets of national security doctrine is that courts play a 
deeply modest role in shaping and adjudicating the executive’s national 
security decisions.  In most cases, courts use abstention doctrines and other 
tools to decline to hear such cases on the merits.  When courts do hear these 
cases, they often issue decisions that are highly deferential to executive 
choices.1  The courts’ behavior in the wake of the September 11, 2001 
attacks largely bears this out:  courts have declined to reach the merits of 
almost all of the cases challenging executive policies on renditions, detainee 
treatment and transfers, lethal targeting, and warrantless wiretapping.2  And 
even where the courts have stepped in, they have focused on the decisional 
processes that surround executive decisionmaking, rather than on the 
substance of those decisions themselves.3 
 
 1. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 135 (2007) (stating that Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush were “little more than slaps on the wrist” because the Court 
“did not at that time require the President to alter many of his actions”); BENJAMIN WITTES, 
LAW AND THE LONG WAR 104–05 (2008); Owen Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 643, 647 (2008) (suggesting that the Supreme Court has resolved 
Guantánamo-related cases on “the narrowest ground” necessary); Stephen I. Vladeck, The 
Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122, 125 (2011) (arguing that 
courts have been “decidedly unwilling to engage the substance of counterterrorism 
policies”). 
 2. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (warrantless 
wiretapping); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(rendition); Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (detainee transfers); Al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (targeting). 
 3. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of Guantánamo Bay, 27 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 1, 20 (2009) (“How is it that the Administration has lost, and lost, and lost again, 
and still has not been ordered against its will to release a single detainee?”); Aziz Z. Huq, 
Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 238–39 (“Final 
judgments in habeas cases were thus directly and proximately linked to relief in less than 
two percent of actual releases from Guantánamo.”); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, 
Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism:  An Institutional Process 
Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2004) (arguing that in 
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Some national security scholars celebrate this state of affairs.4  In their 
view, courts are structurally ill equipped to assess the executive’s 
intelligence and security calculations, which often must be made rapidly 
and which carry important foreign policy implications.  These scholars also 
believe that the executive is far more accountable to the public than courts, 
such that its decisions will be guided and tempered by the public will. 
Other scholars, in contrast, bemoan the absence of courts from the 
playing field.5  To them, the executive has undue incentives to emphasize 
security values over liberty values, and only a vigorous judicial role can 
counter that.  More broadly, these scholars view robust judicial deference to 
the executive as weakening a critical tool by which to inhibit a single 
branch of government from accruing undue power.  Both camps tend to 
assume, however, that the courts do play only a limited role in executive 
calculations about appropriate national security policies. 
That assumption is flawed, and this Article demonstrates why.  Against a 
backdrop of limited direct judicial involvement in its security policies, the 
executive is highly attuned to potential court action.  When the executive 
faces a credible threat of litigation or the pendency of one or more specific 
cases, it often alters the affected national security policies in ways that 
render them more rights protective.  These policy changes remain in place 
regardless of the outcomes of particular cases and affect a large number of 
individuals.  This Article refers to this phenomenon as the “observer 
effect.”  In physics, the “observer effect” refers to the changes that an act of 
observation makes on the phenomenon being observed.6  In psychology, 
some experts believe that individuals alter their performance or behavior 
when they know that someone else is observing them.7  In the context of 
 
times of crisis courts focus on the institutional processes by which the political branches 
make decisions); Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure:  Conditional Deference in the 
Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661 (2009); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and 
Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008); Kim Lane Scheppele, 
The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L. REV. 111 (2012) (noting that legal victories in the 
high-profile “war on terror” cases directly resulted in very little change in petitioners’ lives). 
But see Trevor W. Morrison, The Middle Ground in Judicial Review of Enemy Combatant 
Detentions, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 453, 470–71 (2009) (concluding that the Court has 
made substantive judicial decisions on national security statutes while leaving constitutional 
questions undecided).  The habeas cases are an exception to the courts’ reluctance to opine 
on the specific status of detainees, though (as discussed infra) the D.C. Circuit has proven 
very government friendly in these cases. 
 4. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 5. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 6. Quantum Theory Demonstrated:  Observation Affects Reality, SCI. DAILY (Feb. 27, 
1998), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1998/02/980227055013.htm. 
 7. This is often called the Hawthorne effect. See L.N. JEWELL, CONTEMPORARY 
INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 4 (1998) (defining the Hawthorne effect as 
“changes in behavior that are brought about through special attention to the behavior”); 
DEBRA L. NELSON & JAMES CAMPBELL QUICK, UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAVIOR, at A-4 (2003) (stating that people’s knowledge that they are being studied leads 
them to modify their behavior).  To the extent that the observer effect in psychology works 
even when the observer takes no action, it is not a perfect analogue to the effect I describe in 
this Article.  This Article’s observer effect requires courts to take some action, even if 
limited, to prompt executive policy alterations. 
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this Article, the observer effect refers to the effect on the executive8 when it 
becomes aware that a court soon may review on the merits a particular 
executive policy. 
For example, in the context of looming litigation, the government 
repeatedly has amended its detention review procedures in Afghanistan, 
each time granting detainees increased levels of procedural protections—
even though courts have never mandated that it do so.  It has regulated its 
own invocation of the state secrets doctrine, introducing additional layers of 
process and a commitment to external oversight, even though the courts 
ultimately upheld the government’s use of that doctrine in several series of 
cases.  It has revealed details about the long-classified process by which it 
determines when and under what conditions it would transfer security 
detainees to foreign governments.  And it has established more rigorous 
procedural hurdles for itself before it will seek to use secret evidence in 
deportation cases—all as a result of the observer effect. 
Legal scholarship lacks a sustained theoretical account of how and why 
this phenomenon works to influence executive policymaking.9  Courts are 
not the only audiences for executive policies, and as a result the observer 
effect is not the executive’s only source of incentives to alter those policies.  
However, because courts can strike down executive policies, force the 
executive to comply with specific policies crafted by the courts, and 
mandate the creation of new policies as a matter of law, courts are a key 
audience for the executive’s national security policies.  As a result, it is 
important to understand when, how, and why the observer effect works. 
The observer effect, however, does more than simply inform why and 
how the executive changes its national security policies.  It also can (and 
should) inform ongoing descriptive and normative debates about national 
security deference.  Some scholars claim that “in crises, the executive 
 
 8. As many have noted, the executive (like courts and Congress) is a “they,” not an 
“it.”  Indeed, tensions among different agencies that have equities in a particular policy 
affect the strength of the observer effect in particular cases. See infra Part II.A.1.b.  For ease 
of discussing the interbranch relationship between the executive and the courts, however, 
this Article generally refers to the “executive branch” or the “U.S. government” as a single 
entity. 
 9. See Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Checks on the President, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 646, 661–62 (George C. Edwards III & William 
G. Howell eds., 2009) (“Even more intriguing, however, is the possibility of further work 
examining the executive and how it responds to the courts, or fails to do so. . . .  
[U]nderstanding how both institutions think about and react to one another will ultimately be 
essential to understanding the operation of the judicial check.  Relatively little is known 
about how judicial signals are processed within the executive branch and how legal 
interpretations are made, permeated, and implemented through the executive branch. . . .  In 
short, the judicial check will matter more if the executive branch anticipates it and adjusts its 
behavior accordingly.  Further theoretical and empirical investigation is needed to flesh out 
whether and under what conditions the executive anticipates judicial action.”); see also Cass 
R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 
656 (1985) (“[I]t is important to keep in mind the fact, traditionally overlooked in 
discussions of judicial review of agency action, that the availability of review will often 
serve as an important constraint on regulators during the decisionmaking process long before 
review actually comes into play.”). 
832 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
governs nearly alone, at least so far as law is concerned,”10 and that the 
courts’ monitoring function is broken.11  Scholars are sharply divided about 
whether that is a good thing or a bad thing.  The existence of the observer 
effect calls into question a key premise of the debate by revealing that the 
executive does not in fact govern “nearly alone,” at least when the 
executive reasonably can foresee that a court may step in to review 
particular security policies.  Yet the way the observer effect operates allows 
the executive to preserve and utilize its functional advantages to craft 
pragmatic security policies, avoiding what critics see as the more 
problematic effects of judicial involvement in national security 
decisionmaking. 
A word is in order about the normative desirability of the observer effect.  
The overriding goal of this Article is to explain the observer effect, rather 
than to justify it.  It also is exceedingly complicated (if not impossible), as 
an empirical matter, to determine whether the policy shifts engendered by 
the effect advance or hinder an ideal balance between national security and 
individual liberty.12  Nevertheless, in laying out the operation of the 
observer effect, this Article shows why the present system is better than we 
may think at preserving the respective strengths of courts and the executive, 
as long as courts periodically (and perhaps unpredictably) decline to defer 
to the executive. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I introduces the idea of the 
observer effect and identifies a number of its real world manifestations.  
This Part also explores why the effect is highly relevant in the national 
security arena, without foreclosing the possibility that it operates in other 
areas of law.  Part II further parses the phenomenon, considering the 
second-order effects that follow when the executive develops national 
security policies in the shadow of court observation, and the factors that 
make the observer effect most potent.  This Part then argues that the explicit 
and implicit dialogue that transpires between the courts and the executive 
plays an important role as the executive, under the influence of the observer 
effect, considers where to establish the contours of its policy.  Part II also 
addresses the extent to which the observer effect is a distinct cause of policy 
change.  Part III identifies the observer effect’s implications for national 
security law.  It describes the empirical and normative debates about 
national security deference and argues that the observer effect has been a 
missing element in those debates.  After identifying the constitutional 
equities underlying these deference debates, it defends the conclusion that 
the observer effect allows courts and the executive to advance different 
 
 10. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:  AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4 (2010). 
 11. Id. at 18–19. 
 12. Jack Goldsmith, A Reply to Professor Katyal, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 188, 193 (2013) 
(“The optimal level of presidential constraint—in national security and other contexts—is 
elusive because it depends on ever-changing and sometimes unknowable facts (about, for 
example, the nature of the threat or the efficacy of particular counterterrorism policies), as 
well as contested normative judgments (about, for example, what the Constitution permits or 
what morality requires).”). 
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separation of powers values at a lower cost than generally is recognized.  
With those constitutional values in mind, Part IV explores how and why 
courts, the executive, and Congress may wish to amplify (or minimize) the 
observer effect. 
I.  THE OBSERVER EFFECT AND EXECUTIVE POLICYMAKING 
Political scientists and some legal scholars have long understood that the 
three branches of the federal government are strategic actors.  Each branch 
recognizes the interdependence of its actions in relation to the other 
branches, and each takes into account the predicted reactions by the other 
branches when making its decisions.13  Much of the scholarly work 
exploring this interdependence focuses on the Congress-court and 
Congress-executive relationships, with less attention paid to the executive-
court interplay.14 
This Part explores the strategic (and interdependent) relationship between 
the executive branch and courts in the national security context, in an 
attempt to understand the executive’s “anticipated response calculations,”15 
and how those calculations should affect the way we evaluate national 
security deference.  In the national security arena, the executive historically 
has claimed for itself (and the courts and Congress have given it) significant 
flexibility of action.  In cases ranging from Haig v. Agee16 to Al-Aulaqi v. 
Obama,17 courts have acknowledged the need to rely on the executive’s 
unique capacities to protect the country from national security threats.  One 
naturally might think that the executive’s response calculations would be 
muted at best:  with little fear of oversight or overruling, the executive 
should have a reduced need to be strategic when setting security policies.  
This conception of the executive’s response calculations, however, 
significantly oversimplifies the executive-court relationship in the national 
security arena. 
A.  Defining the Observer Effect 
The phrase “observer effect” describes the impact on executive policy 
setting of pending or probable court consideration of a specific national 
security policy.  The executive’s awareness of likely judicial oversight over 
particular national security policies—an awareness that ebbs and flows—
 
 13. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword:  Law As Equilibrium, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 26, 36 (1994) (claiming that interdependent decisionmakers “will behave 
strategically, choosing the course of action that best achieves their goals in light of how they 
anticipate other decisionmakers will respond to their own possible choices”); Pablo T. 
Spiller & Rafael Gely, Strategic Judicial Decision-Making, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LAW AND POLITICS 34 (Gregory A. Caldeira et al. eds., 2008). 
 14. See supra note 9. 
 15. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 13, at 36 (emphasis omitted).  In Adrian Vermeule’s 
phrasing, the article specifies one mechanism by which uncertainty in the legal system 
produces institutional caution. Adrian Vermeule, Holmes on Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
163, 180 (2008). 
 16. 453 U.S. 280, 295 (1981). 
 17. 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
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plays a significant role as a forcing mechanism.  It drives the executive 
branch to alter, disclose, and improve those policies before courts actually 
review them.  The observer effect is distinct from the executive’s response 
to court orders that require the executive to make specific changes to a 
particular security policy.  The observer effect leads to nonmandatory 
policy changes by the executive—even before a court reaches the merits of 
a case challenging that policy (or a related one)—as a result of newfound 
uncertainty about whether and how courts may evaluate those policies. 
The effect leads the executive to select different policies than those it 
would adopt if it were certain that those policies would not face judicial 
consideration.  Where the executive has a high degree of confidence that a 
court will review its policy, the executive has strong incentives to select a 
policy option it is confident a court would uphold.18  Where—as often is 
true in national security cases—there is more doubt about whether a court 
will intervene, the executive may take a greater gamble in setting a policy.19  
As long as judicial review is reasonably foreseeable, however, the observer 
effect results in a form of executive deference to courts—or deference to a 
prediction about the type of national security policy an “average” court 
would uphold.20 
The theory that the executive responds to an observer effect contains a 
critical assumption worth stating plainly:  the executive views law—
including case law—as binding and tends to comply with it.  In The 
Executive Unbound, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule express doubt about 
this proposition, arguing that the executive is unfettered by legal 
constraints.21  Their critics highlight various ways in which that statement is 
false as a descriptive matter, including by offering examples of situations in 
which the executive has declined to pursue its preferred course of action 
 
 18. One might expect to see an intense form of the observer effect in a typical agency 
decision to issue a formal rule on a controversial topic, such as environmental regulation.  In 
these cases, the executive will be keenly aware of the courts’ past and future involvement 
(and jurisprudence) when setting policy.  High-frequency, direct scrutiny of executive 
branch policies would pose a problem for national security policymaking, but a theme in this 
Article is that the courts (and the public) can reap at least some of the rewards of potential 
judicial oversight without such high-intensity judicial involvement. 
 19. For a few examples of situations in which an entity’s awareness that it might be 
watched affects that entity’s behavior, see IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION 4–5 (1992) (arguing that when the government credibly asserts a willingness to 
regulate intrusively, it may prompt actors in the marketplace to produce regulations of their 
own), and JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 205–06 (2012) (describing the effect 
on prisoners of their awareness that a guard may or may not be watching their misbehavior). 
 20. When the government does not know in advance what judge (or panel of judges) will 
hear the case, the government effectively will need to calculate the “average” views of the 
federal judiciary.  That task becomes easier when many national security cases arise (or 
when Congress mandates that litigants bring particular types of cases) in the same circuit—
as with detainee habeas cases in the D.C. Circuit.  In the latter case, the government would 
contemplate whether a particular policy would survive a panel composed of three judges 
who often are least sympathetic to government positions. 
 21. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 4 (“[T]he legally constrained executive is 
now a historical curiosity.”). 
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because it viewed that course as legally unavailable.22  The observer effect 
offers additional support for the conclusion that the executive branch is 
attuned to the power of law by showing how the executive internalizes 
anticipated judicial responses to its policies when drawing policy lines.23 
Several scholars have expressed an intuition that legal uncertainty plays 
an important role in limiting the extent to which the political branches 
aggrandize their own powers.24  However, legal scholarship offers no 
discussion of why and how uncertainty about judicial involvement affects 
executive policy choices, particularly in the national security area.25  This 
section does so.  The observer effect results from the confluence of at least 
three elements:  (1) a triggering event; (2) robust jurisdictional or 
substantive uncertainty; and (3) the likelihood of recurring scenarios. 
1.  Triggering Event 
Various litigation-related activity can trigger the observer effect.  This 
ranges from the filing of a nonfrivolous case, to some indication from a 
court that it may reach the merits of a case (i.e., ordering briefing on an 
issue, or rejecting the government’s motion for summary judgment), to the 
court’s consideration of the issue on the merits.  The observer effect most 
clearly comes into play when a court becomes seized with a national 
security case after an extended period of judicial noninvolvement in 
security issues.  The observer effect then kicks in to influence the 
 
 22. Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1398–1403 
(2012); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 777 (2012); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Goldilocks Executive, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 973, 974 (2012). 
 23. See Pildes, supra note 22, at 1401 (discussing the “undoubted tendency of presidents 
to make decisions, or avoid them, with an eye toward the anticipated responses of other 
relevant actors”). 
 24. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1042 
(2004) (stating that courts during peacetime issue “remarkably astringent commentaries on 
the use of emergency powers,” which produces “a cloud of suspicion and restrains officials 
who might otherwise resort to emergency powers too lightly”); Prakash & Ramsey, supra 
note 22, at 992 (“Judicial review of executive action matters because the knowledge of such 
review affects what the Executive will do.  Executives typically do not wish to be sued, 
meaning that they often will take measures designed to stave off such suits and avoid actions 
that raise the risk of litigation.”); Vermeule, supra note 15, at 180 (suggesting that a possible 
benefit of legal uncertainty is that it “creates a kind of caution, keeping all actors or 
institutions from pressing the limits of their authority”). 
 25. Political scientists have used game theory to explore the relationships between the 
different branches of government and the way in which constraints imposed by other 
institutions define the nature of a particular institution’s power to act. See Rui J. P. de 
Figueiredo, Jr. et al., The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to American Politics, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 199 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman 
eds., 2006); Matthew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Judiciary and the Role of 
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra, at 273, 274 (stating that the 
fundamental insight of positive political theory is that courts are constrained in their 
interpretive choices by the possibility that Congress may overturn their decisions).  Even 
though the observer effect incorporates a comparable insight—that the executive is 
constrained in its policy choices by the possibility that the courts may overturn those 
policies—I have found no studies that apply game theory to the relationship between the 
executive and the courts outside the framework of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
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executive’s approach to the policy being challenged in the triggering case, 
as well as to future (or other preexisting) executive policies in the vicinity 
of that triggering case.  The other executive policies affected by the 
triggering case must be loosely related to the policy being challenged in the 
triggering case, but need not overlap with that precise policy.  Thus, a U.S. 
Supreme Court holding that the United States must provide certain review 
procedures to individuals being held as enemy combatants in a particular 
geographic location will trigger the observer effect for many future policies 
related to detention, whether or not those policies directly implicate the 
factual or legal scenarios in the case that the Court decided.26 
Consider a situation in which the executive branch long operated without 
judicial oversight.  Military decisions about who to detain as enemy 
belligerents offer a paradigmatic case.27  For decades, the military made 
independent decisions about which individuals to detain during armed 
conflict without considering that a court might oversee or revisit these 
decisions.28  Along came Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen detained by 
U.S. forces on the battlefield in Afghanistan in 2001 and brought to the 
United States.29  Hamdi’s father filed a habeas petition in June 2002, 
contending that Hamdi’s detention was unlawful.30  The subsequent 
Supreme Court decision came as a surprise to many in the U.S. 
government.31  The decision accepted the government’s legal theory that it 
may detain individuals associated with the Taliban as “enemy 
combatants.”32  But the opinion gave little deference to the argument that 
the executive’s constitutional authorities during wartime permitted the 
government to avoid giving Hamdi any opportunity to challenge his 
detention.  Rather, the Court ordered the U.S. government to create a 
process whereby a citizen-detainee may challenge his classification as an 
enemy combatant and required that that process include notice of the factual 
basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut those assertions 
before a neutral decisionmaker.33  The Court thus effectively prevented the 
 
 26. There clearly are cases where the observer effect has not had as robust an impact as 
one might predict, and this Article offers some hypotheses for weaker and stronger 
manifestations of the effect. 
 27. GOLDSMITH, supra note 19, at 166 (noting that the Court almost always sided with 
the executive branch in cases involving its military powers during war); id. at 167 (stating 
that each of the Bush Administration’s two primary legal arguments supporting detention at 
Guantánamo were backed by old legal precedents); id. at 179 (noting that on the surface, the 
Bush Administration’s legal arguments in support of military commissions appeared sound 
because they relied on previous executive and Court precedents). 
 28. Id. at xi. 
 29. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). 
 30. See id. at 511. 
 31. In 1946, a federal court addressed whether the executive could lawfully detain an 
American-born Italian soldier as a prisoner of war.  That court concluded that the soldier 
could not secure his release through a habeas claim. In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 
1946).  This and other World War II precedents prompted Bush Administration lawyers such 
as David Addington to predict that the Supreme Court would not countermand the 
Commander-in-Chief during wartime. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 134. 
 32. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518. 
 33. Id. at 533. 
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executive from retaining sole discretion about whether, when, and how to 
review the status of its detainees.  The filing of the litigation and, more 
importantly, the Court’s holding serve as a triggering event in the detention 
area.34 
The existence of the observer effect leads to a prediction that U.S. 
national security policies will cycle between more aggressive and more 
cautious postures.35  Where the executive is quite certain that courts will not 
review particular security policies, its policies will tend to be more 
aggressive.  Then, one or more triggering events leads the executive to shift 
a variety of its national security policies in a more modest direction, partly 
to fend off further judicial encroachments.  As executive policies “improve” 
over time, and as courts establish predictable jurisprudence on the issue and 
give increasing deference to those more rights-protective policies, the 
observer effect weakens until it falls away.36  At that point, a new triggering 
case will be needed to start the cycle again. 
 
 34. Other recent triggering cases include Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).  In Rasul, the 
Court concluded that detainees at Guantánamo were entitled to statutory habeas corpus 
review of their detentions.  In the government’s view, there was very limited uncertainty up 
to that point about whether their decision not to provide habeas to detainees was lawful; the 
precedents—on their face—supported the government’s arguments. See GOLDSMITH, supra 
note 19, at 189 (describing the administration’s argument in Rasul as reflecting the best 
reading of the precedents, strictly construed); Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John 
C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorneys Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to 
William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens 
Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Dec. 28, 2001).  In Hamdan, the Court declined to defer to 
the executive’s interpretation of the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, though it did so without discussion.  This presumably produced a relatively 
unfocused observer effect by fostering significant executive uncertainty about whether 
Hamdan represented a new era of reduced deference in national security cases. See Jonathan 
F. Mitchell, Legislating Clear-Statement Regimes in National-Security Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 
1059, 1097 (2009) (“[T]he tension between Hamdan and court precedents requiring 
deference to the executive produces a regime of legal uncertainty that could dissuade the 
executive branch from pressing its expansive constitutional-avoidance and implied-repeal 
theories in other contexts whenever judicial review of the merits is possible, even if the 
courts ultimately decide to avoid ruling on the merits.”).  Boumediene served as a triggering 
case because it set off broad questions about the future jurisdictional reach of habeas corpus 
extraterritorially, including for people held as enemy belligerents in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. 
 35. This is not to suggest that the executive branch fails to consider individual rights 
when setting national security policies.  In some cases, those officials who set the policies 
are of two minds about the right approach to a given national security issue and presumably 
will express their ambivalence in interagency discussions. See, e.g., DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL 
OR CAPTURE 41–42 (2012) (describing President Barack Obama as being personally torn 
about policies such as the use of “signature strikes” to target individuals who bore terrorist 
characteristics but whom the U.S. government had not specifically identified).  In other 
cases, different executive agencies simply bring different perspectives to the table about how 
rights-protective a given policy should be.  That disparity of views prompts consideration of 
different ways in which policies under discussion could take into account (or preclude) 
specific individual rights or liberty values. 
 36. As of late 2013, the observer effect appears to be at a low point in the cycle.  The 
D.C. Circuit has established quite predictable jurisprudence on detainee issues and the 
Supreme Court has declined to hear a detainee-related case since it issued its decision in 
Boumediene v. Bush in 2008. 
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2.  Uncertainty 
In addition to an initial, unexpected development indicating that a court 
may review a national security policy on the merits, future uncertainty plays 
a critical role in eliciting the observer effect.  Particularly where the 
executive loses a triggering case on the merits, that triggering case 
introduces significant uncertainty into the executive’s national security 
decisionmaking processes.  This forces the executive to take into account 
the possibility of future judicial oversight over related policies, even as it 
remains unclear whether the court actually will end up reviewing a 
particular policy on the merits, and, if it does, whether the court will 
uphold, strike down, or modify that policy.37  Where the executive is 
confident that no court will entertain a case implicating a particular 
executive national security decision, the observer effect will not appear.  
For instance, courts have virtually never entertained a case challenging the 
executive’s initial decision to use military force abroad.38  There is 
therefore no jurisdictional uncertainty in those cases; we should expect no 
observer effect on executive decisions to initiate hostilities overseas. 
Two interrelated forms of uncertainty are particularly relevant:  
jurisdictional uncertainty and substantive uncertainty.  Jurisdictional 
uncertainty exists when it is unclear whether a court will conclude that it 
can or should exercise jurisdiction over a case—that is, whether a case is 
justiciable.  This includes cases in which court-created doctrines that limit 
merits consideration may apply.  Substantive uncertainty exists where it is 
not obvious what law will govern the dispute at issue, or where there is little 
precedent to guide the courts in resolving the dispute.  We should expect 
the observer effect to be strong when either type of uncertainty is present.39  
 
 37. See David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After Rasul v. 
Bush:  The Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125, 
156 (2005) (noting that uncertainty about which cases a court might review “provides an 
ongoing external incentive for the administrators to set up the administrative system in as 
professional and careful a manner as possible”).  The fact that courts (and the law generally) 
may foster uncertainty in the mind of future litigants has academic roots in the well-known 
article by Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).  Mnookin and Kornhauser argue that when 
divorce law is unclear, negotiations will take place against a backdrop of uncertainty and 
affect each party’s risk calculations. See generally id. 
 38. See Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115–16 (D.D.C. 2011) (referring to a 
line of cases that has “all but foreclosed the idea” that members of Congress may assert 
legislative standing to sue the executive for a use of force abroad); Martin S. Flaherty, The 
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1728 n.11 (1996). 
 39. It is hard to predict whether the observer effect will be stronger when (a) both forms 
of uncertainty are present, or (b) when only substantive uncertainty is present.  In the former 
case, where there is some chance that a court will exercise jurisdiction over a case, as well as 
a lack of clarity about where the court would come out on the merits, the executive will be 
attuned both to the possibility of court intervention and to the uncertainty about whether the 
court will uphold its policy.  This also means that the executive has ample room to structure 
its policies to try to avoid judicial review entirely.  In the latter case, the executive may have 
less room to craft its policies, but it faces the certainty of judicial review, which tends to 
focus the mind.  One example might be wartime detentions conducted inside the United 
States:  courts clearly have habeas jurisdiction but, at least in 2003, it was not clear what 
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In contrast, where there is neither jurisdictional uncertainty nor substantive 
uncertainty, the executive will be quite confident that it will win the case 
and will have little incentive to alter its policies in anticipation of litigation 
or its outcome.40 
Both jurisdictional and substantive uncertainty abound in national 
security cases.  There are a variety of grounds on which courts have 
“condoned executive initiatives in foreign affairs by refusing to hear 
challenges to the president’s authority.”41  These include decisions that the 
case was not ripe, that it presented a political question, that it was moot, that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing, that the defendant was immune from suit, that 
the plaintiffs lacked a cause of action, or that the plaintiffs’ requested relief 
created grounds for dismissing the case.42  Harold Koh suggests that lower 
courts have dismissed so many challenges to executive conduct that “their 
opinions now seem to pick and choose almost randomly from among the 
available abstention rationales.”43  Nevertheless, a line of cases exists in 
which courts have exercised jurisdiction over national security decisions, 
which is critical to sustaining jurisdictional uncertainty.44 
As for substantive uncertainty in the national security area, things have 
not changed much since Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.45  There he wrote, 
A judge, like an executive advisor, may be surprised at the poverty of 
really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems 
of executive power as they actually present themselves.  And court 
decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with 
the largest questions in the most narrow way.46 
In Jack Goldsmith’s view, “What the law required was uncertain at best in 
2002, and if anything, it favored the government.”47  Various international 
and domestic law questions arose in the wake of the September 11 attacks:  
Could nonstate actors commit armed attacks against a state that trigger the 
state’s right of self-defense?  How do the Geneva Conventions apply to 
terrorist groups that operate from within different states?  What review 
procedures must a state apply to detentions not covered by the 
 
standards courts would apply to review the government’s determination that an individual 
was an enemy combatant. See John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 446 (2003). 
 40. This assumes that the executive’s policy is consistent with existing law.  It is hard to 
imagine responsible governmental decisionmakers intentionally taking an approach known 
to be inconsistent with existing doctrine. 
 41. HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 146–47 (1990). 
 42. Id. at 147. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on 
Terror:  An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 392 (2010). 
 45. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 46. Id. at 634–35. 
 47. GOLDSMITH, supra note 19, at 166. 
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Conventions?48  What activities did the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF) approve?  Faced with questions such as these—and 
virtually no domestic precedent for how to handle them—there was 
considerable substantive uncertainty before and in the first several years 
after September 11, 2001. 
3.  Prospect of Future Litigation 
The third factor that helps secure the observer effect’s operation is the 
likelihood of future litigation on related issues.  If a court declines to defer 
to the executive in a particular case, that decision is unlikely to create an 
observer effect if the executive is confident that the factual and legal 
questions at issue in that case will not arise again.49  In contrast, when the 
executive perceives that a set of policies is likely to come under sustained 
litigation (and thus under the potential oversight of multiple judges over 
time), it is more likely to concertedly review those policies. 
The iterative litigation on U.S. detention policies offers a paradigmatic 
example.  Among the first set of cases that the courts took up after 
September 11 were cases involving detainees held at Guantánamo or in the 
United States.  From this body of cases, it is easy to see (especially in 
retrospect) how litigation then followed from detainees held in other 
locations (Iraq and Afghanistan); from Guantánamo detainees challenging 
other aspects of their detention, including transfers to third countries; from 
individuals who alleged that the government had transferred them to third 
countries where they were mistreated; and from former detainees for 
alleged mistreatment while in U.S. detention.  The first Guantánamo cases 
proved to be the tip of a very large iceberg of detention-and-transfer-related 
litigation.  As this trend became clear to the executive, it would have 
secured the operation of the observer effect. 
*  *  * 
When these three elements are present, the observer effect is likely to 
come into play.  How does the executive react?  This Article assumes that 
the executive branch is, collectively, a rational actor that attempts to 
maximize the total value of two elements:  a sufficiently security-focused 
policy and unilateral control over national security policymaking.  To 
achieve this goal, the executive often is willing to cede some ground on the 
first element to retain the second element. 
The executive branch therefore often responds to the presence of these 
three elements by shifting its policy to a position that gives it greater 
confidence that the courts would uphold it if presented with a challenge to 
 
 48. For a discussion of such questions, see John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. 
Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts:  Four Challenges for the 
Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201 (2011). 
 49. Of course, the observer effect may kick in during the pendency of the triggering case 
itself, causing the executive to modify its challenged policy in the middle of litigation. 
2013] THE OBSERVER EFFECT 841 
that policy.50  This does not mean, however, that it will establish or revise 
its policy to a point at which it has full confidence that a court will deem the 
policy acceptable.  Instead, the executive has strong incentives to take a 
gamble:  all the executive needs to do is establish a policy that is close 
enough to what a court would find acceptable that it alters the court’s 
calculation about whether to engage on the merits.51  The executive thus 
will shift from a policy that would prompt nondeference to a policy that 
allows the court credibly to defer.  On occasion, the executive may adopt 
policies that are more rights protective than what a court eventually 
requires.  In at least one recent case, the executive adopted policies that 
proved more protective of detainee equities than the court of appeals 
ultimately demanded.52  With these shifts in policy, the executive narrows 
the “degree” of deference required to uphold the policy in question because 
the assertion of executive authority is more modest.  The next section 
provides several real world examples of such policy shifts. 
B.  Examples of the Effect 
The executive’s response to the observer effect generally manifests itself 
in one of three ways:  the executive creates a policy from whole cloth, 
amends an existing policy, or reveals new information about the internal 
procedures by which the executive implements a particular policy.  Several 
real world examples illustrate how the observer effect impacts executive 
policymaking. 
 
 50. Embedded in this is an assumption that “abstention” doctrines give courts significant 
flexibility to credibly decline to adjudicate a range of cases. See Michael J. Gerhardt, How a 
Judge Thinks, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2185, 2189 (2009). 
 51. One could draw parallels to the idea of “enforced self-regulation,” in which “[e]ach 
firm in an industry is required to propose its own regulatory standards if it is to avoid harsher 
(and less tailored) standards imposed by the state.” AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 19, at 
101; see also Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859 (2009). 
Posner and Vermeule describe ways in which the executive can signal his credibility to the 
public by diminishing presidential control over policymaking, through a mechanism they 
term “self-binding.”  Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 865, 868 (2007).  This self-binding allows the president to demonstrate that his 
chosen policies are benign and faithful to the public’s desires, with the broader goal of 
accruing greater executive power in other areas.  At a general level, the observer effect 
prompts a form of self-binding, as it leads the executive to limit its own scope of action in 
particular policy contexts.  The executive’s goal in the latter situation, however, is somewhat 
different from the goal of the “self-binding” described by Posner and Vermeule.  The 
operation of the observer effect tends to allow the executive to retain control over 
policymaking in specific contexts by deterring direct judicial intervention. 
 52. The government accepted that it needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that a detainee met its detention standard.  The D.C. Circuit suggested that it would be 
content with a lower standard—possibly a “some evidence” standard. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 
613 F.3d 1102, 1104–05 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  Additionally, the D.C. Circuit panel in Al-Bihani 
v. Obama concluded that the executive had unnecessarily tied its hands in finding itself 
bound by international law in interpreting the AUMF. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 
872 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, later deemed that conclusion dicta. 
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).  These appear to be examples 
of what John Calfee and Richard Craswell termed “overcompliance.” John E. Calfee & 
Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 965, 965 (1984). 
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1.  Establishing Policy 
The observer effect may pressure the executive to create new policies to 
fend off future litigation.  In particular, a triggering event may suggest to 
the executive that the lack of a policy process to govern certain decisions 
will expose it to a new wave of lawsuits.  In this case, the executive crafts a 
policy to signal to courts that it is monitoring its own actions responsibly. 
The observer effect manifested itself in several ways in some of the 
earliest post–September 11 litigation.  That it did so suggests that the effect 
plays a role even in presidential administrations that adhere to a particularly 
strong version of executive unilateralism.  In 2003, the Court granted 
certiorari in Rasul v. Bush.53  The petitioners in Rasul sought review of their 
detention under the federal habeas corpus statute.54  To that point, the 
government had asserted that the laws of war allowed it to hold detainees at 
Guantánamo as combatants until the end of the conflict without according 
them a hearing.55  The looming Court review prompted the government to 
establish a new policy toward detainee hearings.56  On the day that the U.S. 
government’s merits brief was due in the Court, the government 
promulgated Administrative Review Boards (ARBs).  The ARBs 
constituted an annual threat-based review, intended to ensure that the 
executive did not hold detainees at Guantánamo longer than national 
security required.57  The executive almost certainly concluded that it would 
be more likely to win Rasul in the Supreme Court if it had a better story to 
tell about its detention policies, particularly if the executive developed a 
predictable avenue by which to review each detainee’s case and release or 
transfer some detainees.  The fact that the executive described these new 
procedures in its brief to the Court supports this theory.58 
As is well known, the government lost its case in Rasul, with the Court 
holding that Guantánamo detainees were entitled to statutory habeas 
corpus.59  On the same day, the Court in Hamdi held that the United States 
was required to provide a U.S. citizen detainee with “notice of the factual 
basis for his [enemy combatant] classification, and a fair opportunity to 
rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker.”60 
 
 53. 540 U.S. 1003 (2003) (mem.). 
 54. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). 
 55. John Mintz, U.S. Outlines Plan for Detainee Review, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2004, at 
A10. 
 56. Martinez, supra note 3, at 1050. 
 57. Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y of Def. to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Sec’y of Def. for Policy, Revised Implementation of 
Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, ¶ 1(c) (July 14, 2006), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/
Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf. 
 58. Brief for the Respondents at 5–6, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 
03-343), 2004 WL 425739, at *5–6. 
 59. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484. 
 60. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). 
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The Court’s decision in Rasul created uncertainty for the executive:  
What processes should the government establish to address the forthcoming 
habeas challenges from Guantánamo detainees?  And what level of review 
would the district courts exercise in assessing the legality of the detainees’ 
custody?  Hamdi provided somewhat greater guidance about what processes 
might pass constitutional muster, but the decision on its face only applied to 
American citizens.  In what seems to have been an effort to create a 
substitute for statutory habeas review and to get out in front of possible 
future court decisions applying Hamdi-type reasoning to alien detainees, the 
executive established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), an 
executive-only process that assessed whether each detainee at Guantánamo 
was an unlawful enemy combatant.61  The government probably believed 
that the CSRTs would deter the courts from examining, in any level of 
detail, the executive’s decision to hold detainees.  Comments by then-
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England provide evidence that the 
observer effect operated here.  Deputy Secretary England noted that Hamdi 
involved a U.S. citizen, but that the decision “raised concerns about 
potential implications for noncitizen detainees.”62  He also described the 
decision to establish CSRTs, which applied to citizens and aliens alike, as 
an effort to “get ahead of the curve.”63 
To the extent that the CSRTs created in 2004 reflected a policy judgment 
by the executive about where the courts would come out in future cases, the 
executive misjudged its hand significantly.64  Yet the observer effect does 
not predict that, in every case, the executive will shift its policy to a 
location acceptable to courts.  It only explains when and why the executive 
will be attuned to perceived judicial preferences as it draws policy lines. 
 
 61. The government continued to argue against judicial review of the outcomes of 
individual CSRT proceedings entirely, and posited that if judicial review were required, “it 
should go no further than to determine whether there is ‘some evidence’ supporting the 
findings of activity or status that the President . . . has determined to warrant removal of an 
alien from the field of battle.” Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion 
To Dismiss or for Judgment As a Matter of Law and Memorandum in Support at 50, Hicks 
v. Bush, 452 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 04-CV-1254 (HHK)), 2004 WL 5378102. 
 62. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE H. ARMED SERVS. 
COMM., 112th CONG., LEAVING GUANTANAMO 51 (Comm. Print 2012). 
 63. Id.; see also David A. Martin, Judicial Review and the Military Commissions Act:  
On Striking the Right Balance, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 344, 349 (2007) (noting that the 
government’s changes to its detention policies evidently were intended “to reduce exposure 
to negative rulings in the predictably forthcoming Guantánamo habeas challenges”). 
 64. The Rasul opinion might also have created uncertainty for the executive about 
whether future courts might conclude that detainees at Guantánamo had constitutional rights. 
See, e.g., Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Guantanamo Bay is in every 
practical respect a United States territory.”).  The observer effect occasioned by this 
uncertainty may have led the executive to argue in its post-Rasul briefs that CSRTs would 
satisfy Fifth Amendment due process requirements. Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus and Motion To Dismiss or for Judgment As a Matter of Law and Memorandum in 
Support, supra note 61. 
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2.  Amending Policy 
More commonly, the observer effect creates pressure on the government 
to improve existing policies.  This occurs when a triggering event prompts 
the executive to revisit existing policies through the lens of possible judicial 
review. 
a.  Detention 
In several cases, the observer effect has manifested itself as pressure to 
modify existing detention policies to provide greater procedural protections 
to detainees.  One example is the president’s 2011 Executive Order, which 
reinstituted, updated, and renamed the Administrative Review Boards, the 
system for conducting periodic threat-based reviews of detainees at 
Guantánamo.65  There are several reasons that the executive may have 
chosen to do this, including to mitigate pressure from constituents who 
hoped that President Barack Obama would close Guantánamo.  But the 
executive likely also took this step to try to stave off a second round of 
habeas litigation.66  The executive presumably is (and should be) concerned 
that if it detains some of the individuals at Guantánamo for another several 
years without additional review, the courts may step back in to review the 
detainees’ cases, even though federal courts rejected their habeas petitions 
once before. 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld67 and Boumediene v. Bush68 may have focused the 
government’s mind on this risk.  The majority in Hamdi stated: 
If the Government does not consider this unconventional war won for two 
generations . . . then the position it has taken throughout the litigation of 
this case suggests that Hamdi’s detention could last for the rest of his 
life. . . .  Further, we understand Congress’ grant of authority for the use 
of “necessary and appropriate force” to include the authority to detain for 
the duration of the relevant conflict . . . .  If the practical circumstances of 
 
 65. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011). 
 66. Two aspects of the Executive Order’s Periodic Review Board (PRB) process may 
represent executive efforts to respond to concerns previously expressed by courts.  First, the 
PRBs allow detainees to hire private counsel; the Court in Boumediene v. Bush was 
concerned about the detainees’ lack of assistance of counsel during their Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767 (2008); Exec. Order No. 
13,567, supra note 65, § 3(a)(2).  Second, the Executive Order provides that when the PRB 
designates a detainee for transfer, “the Secretaries of State and Defense shall be responsible 
for ensuring that vigorous efforts are undertaken to identify a suitable transfer location for 
any such detainee, outside of the United States, consistent with the national security and 
foreign policy interests of the United States and the commitment set forth in section 2242(a) 
of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998.” Exec. Order No. 13,567, 
supra note 65, § 4(a).  A persistent strain of litigation has pressed courts to order the 
executive to transfer detainees after they have been identified as eligible for such transfers.  
Section 4(a) appears to constitute a strong signal to courts that the executive is committed to 
finding appropriate placements for those detainees. 
 67. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 68. 553 U.S. at 723. 
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a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the 
development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.69 
Justice Kennedy echoed this sentiment in Boumediene v. Bush, noting, 
“Because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of limited duration, 
it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers undefined.  
If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for 
years to come, the Court might not have this luxury.”70 
The Court thus has signaled its potential impatience for detention that 
begins to look indefinite.  This may well have led the executive to announce 
a policy (updated from the Bush Administration’s version) that signaled its 
continued attention to those detentions, and that, once underway, may 
prompt the executive to release additional detainees from Guantánamo.  
Periodic detention reviews by the executive may give courts greater 
confidence that those detainees have not been “warehoused” for the rest of 
their lives, and that they face some prospect of release.  In May 2012, the 
Department of Defense issued implementing guidelines for the Executive 
Order, though reviews under the Order have not yet begun.71 
The government frequently announces its changed policies during the 
pendency of litigation in an effort to persuade the relevant court that it need 
not review on the merits the status of a particular set of detainees.  For 
instance, the executive twice modified the policies by which it reviews the 
status of those in U.S. military custody in Afghanistan, likely in response to 
then-ongoing litigation (and pursuant to an additional observer effect 
radiating from the Boumediene decision, which held that Guantánamo 
detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus). 
In Al Maqaleh v. Gates, a D.C. District Court had to decide, in the wake 
of Boumediene, whether certain detainees held by the Defense Department 
in Afghanistan were entitled to habeas corpus review.72  The Boumediene 
Court established several factors that are relevant to determining when 
constitutional habeas attaches extraterritorially.73  One factor requires 
courts to assess the adequacy of the process by which the United States has 
 
 69. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520–21. 
 70. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797–98; see also id. at 801 (Souter, J., concurring) (“After 
six years of sustained executive detentions in Guantanamo, subject to habeas jurisdiction but 
without any actual habeas scrutiny, today’s decision is . . . an act of perseverance in trying to 
make habeas review, and the obligation of the courts to provide it, mean something of value 
both to prisoners and to the Nation.”). 
 71. Memorandum from U.S. Deputy Sec’y of Def. to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts et al., 
Implementing Guidelines for Periodic Review of Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay per 
Executive Order 13,567 (May 9, 2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/DTM-12-005.pdf.  The observer effect thus may have provided the impetus to 
develop and announce the new policy, but the continued pro-government rulings in the D.C. 
Circuit, and the Supreme Court’s decisions not to grant certiorari in any new Guantánamo 
cases, suggest that the observer effect may have waned in this area.  Without a looming 
threat of judicial involvement, the executive faces reduced incentives to initiate reviews 
under the 2011 Order. 
 72. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 73. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
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determined a detainee’s status.74  In applying that factor in Al Maqaleh, the 
D.C. District Court criticized the executive’s detention procedures at 
Bagram as falling short of even the much-maligned Guantánamo detention 
review procedures.75  The court held for the detainees but allowed the 
government to take an interlocutory appeal.76  In September 2009, just 
before filing its brief in the D.C. Circuit, the Obama Administration issued 
new guidelines for detention review in Afghanistan that gave the detainees 
a greater ability to challenge their custody.77  In news reports, a Defense 
Department official acknowledged that the new policies would bolster the 
government’s case, stating, “We want to be able to go into court and say we 
have good review procedures.”78  Although the D.C. Circuit formally based 
its decision on the old review procedures rather than the new ones,79 this 
does not mean that the government’s public issuance of the new procedures 
had no effect on the court’s decision.  Those new procedures may well have 
given the D.C. Circuit additional confidence in holding for the U.S. 
government.  If so, the Defense Department’s altered policies had their 
desired effect. 
In 2010, the Al Maqaleh detainees refiled their case, claiming changed 
circumstances.80  Just before the government’s brief was due in district 
court, the process repeated itself, with the Obama Administration revealing 
another rule change that favored the petitioners.81  The change ensured that 
exchanges between detainees and their personal representatives would be 
considered confidential, establishing something akin to the attorney-client 
privilege.82  In the U.S. government’s motion to dismiss the detainees’ 
amended petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, the government discussed in 
detail the changes to the detainee review process, noting, 
Whatever weight the Court of Appeals had placed on the [Unlawful 
Enemy Combatant Review Board] procedures then at issue before it, it is 
necessarily true that new [Detainee Review Board] procedures can only 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp 2d at 219. 
 76. Id. at 235–36. 
 77. Eric Schmitt, U.S. Will Expand Detainee Review in Afghan Prison, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 13, 2009, at A1 (“The changes have come as the administration is expected as early as 
Monday to file a formal written brief explaining its opposition to a ruling by a federal district 
judge, John D. Bates, in April.”). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 80. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 899 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 81. See Memorandum from Dep’t of Def. to U.S. Military Forces Conducting Detention 
Operations in Afg., Detainee Review Board Policy Memorandum (July 11, 2010), available 
at http://www.politico.com/static/PPM205_bagrambrfb.html. 
 82. According to one report, “The memo was originally classified ‘secret’ but was 
apparently declassified before being filed in court Thursday in cases seeking court review of 
the detentions of several prisoners at Bagram.” Josh Gerstein, U.S. Officers Representing 
Afghan Prisoners Get More Lawyerly, Under the Radar, POLITICO (May 20, 2011, 5:12 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0511/US_officers_representing_Afghanistan_pri
soners_get_more_lawyerly.html.  The decision to reveal this policy might also fit within the 
examples listed in Part I.B.3, infra. 
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further support the Court of Appeals’ ultimate conclusion that the 
Suspension Clause does not apply to Bagram Airfield.83 
The district court recently held that habeas does not extend to the Al 
Maqaleh petitioners, taking note in its opinion of the “procedural 
improvements” that were “at least marginally better and more detainee-
protective” than the prior procedures at Bagram.84 
The observer effect triggered by the holding in Boumediene and the mere 
existence of the Al Maqaleh litigation is unmistakable.  Several military 
officers (writing in their nonofficial capacity) described Boumediene’s 
effect on detention procedures in Afghanistan.  For example, Lieutenant 
Colonel Jeff Bovarnick (then the Chair of the International and Operational 
Law Department at the Army Judge Advocate General School) compares 
Boumediene and Al Maqaleh and notes that “if the same litigation pattern 
emerges for the Afghanistan detainees, then it follows that the detention 
review procedures in Afghanistan will receive the same scrutiny as the 
[Guantánamo Combatant Status Review Tribunals].”85  Similarly, Colonel 
Fred Ford writes, “Boumediene, and the potential extension of its holding, 
impacts U.S. detention operations not only at Guantanamo Bay but also at 
Bagram and other current or future detention facilities.”86  Ford bemoans 
the ambiguity that this decision occasions in the executive.87  This Article, 
in contrast, identifies ways in which this type of uncertainty may advance 
separation of powers values. 
Beyond the impact that Boumediene and Al Maqaleh may have had on 
the U.S. government’s specific detention procedures in Afghanistan, those 
cases cast a more diffuse shadow over the direction of U.S. detention in 
Afghanistan.  As the executive branch navigates its drawdown of troops in 
 
 83. Respondents’ Motion To Dismiss Amended Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 
24, Al Maqaleh, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (No. 1:06-cv-01669-JDB). 
 84. Al Maqaleh, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 24, 25. 
 85. Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan:  From Strategic 
Liability to Legitimacy, ARMY LAW., June 2010, at 9, 14; see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 
19, at 13 (“[M]otivated in part to fend off habeas corpus review in Afghanistan, the Obama 
administration had begun to raise the standards of the screening and detention procedures for 
suspects held in Afghanistan.”); Bovarnick, supra, at 35 (“Until Congress enacts a law 
specifying the legal framework for battlefield detention review for terrorists—or, as the 
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procedural protections should be afforded to detainees captured on a foreign 
battlefield . . . ?”). 
 86. Fred K. Ford, Keeping Boumediene Off the Battlefield:  Examining Potential 
Implications of the Boumediene v. Bush Decision to the Conduct of United States Military 
Operations, 30 PACE L. REV. 396, 411 (2010); see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 19, at 193–
94 (quoting senior lawyers in Afghanistan as worried about the prospect that the Supreme 
Court will overturn the D.C. Circuit’s Maqaleh decision, and as saying that these military 
lawyers warn capturing units that law of war detention “must adhere the [sic] highest legal 
standards to avoid habeas litigation”). 
 87. Ford, supra note 86, at 410 (arguing that the Department of Defense “is in the 
untenable position of having to conduct a war and plan for future engagements in an 
uncertain legal landscape”); see also Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held?  Military 
Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 850–51 (2011) (explaining why 
uncertainty about who may be detained may be problematic). 
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Afghanistan and begins to transition detention responsibilities to the 
government of Afghanistan, it faces pressure from Congress not to release a 
number of detainees it now holds.  At the same time, it faces a 
countervailing problem:  it does not want to make affirmative declarations 
that it will not release particular individuals for fear that doing so will tempt 
the D.C. Circuit to revisit its holdings in Al Maqaleh.88  The observer effect 
thus continues to shape U.S. detention policy more broadly. 
b.  State Secrets 
Detention is not the only area in which the observer effect may have 
influenced the evolution of national security policy.  The observer effect 
seems to have contributed to the executive’s decision to alter—and render 
more restrained—its policy about invoking the state secrets privilege.  The 
state secrets privilege is a common law privilege that the government may 
invoke when a case raises legal challenges that cannot be proven or 
defended without disclosing information that would jeopardize U.S. 
national security.89  The privilege protects against the release of information 
that would impair the nation’s defense capabilities, reveal intelligence-
gathering methods or capabilities, or disrupt diplomatic relations with 
foreign governments.90  The privilege has many critics, who fear that the 
privilege allows the executive unfettered discretion and usurps judicial 
power.91 
The executive has invoked the privilege with some regularity, including 
to prevent two types of lawsuits from proceeding:  challenges to the 
National Security Agency’s warrantless wiretapping and claims for 
damages resulting from alleged U.S. renditions of terrorist suspects from 
one country to another.92  Courts have not reacted uniformly to this 
litigation.  In the rendition litigation, for instance, the Fourth Circuit upheld 
the government’s invocation of the privilege.93  In April 2009, however, a 
panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected the use of the privilege in Mohamed v. 
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., concluding that it was not appropriate to stop the 
lawsuit at the outset.94  The Ninth Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc 
and eventually reversed the panel holding, but not before the U.S. Attorney 
General announced a new state secrets policy.95 
 
 88. See Charlie Savage & Graham Bowley, U.S. To Retain Role As a Jailer in 
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at A1. 
 89. Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM 
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 90. Id. at 1935–36. 
 91. Id. at 1932 & n.2. 
 92. Id. at 1941. 
 93. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 94. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Jeppesen I), 579 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 95. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Jeppesen II), 614 F.3d 1070, 1076–77 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc).  The Justice Department announced its new policy on September 23, 
2009. Id. at 1077.  The Ninth Circuit issued its initial decision against the government on 
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In September 2009, the Attorney General instituted new Department of 
Justice (DOJ) policies and procedures governing when and how the 
government would assert the state secrets privilege in litigation.96  The new 
policy was intended to promote “greater accountability” and ensure that the 
privilege “is invoked only when necessary and in the narrowest way 
possible.”97  It highlighted three forms of independent oversight over the 
privilege’s use:  judicial oversight over classified evidence that supports the 
use of the privilege, referrals to relevant Inspectors General when there are 
credible allegations of government wrongdoing but a possibility to 
successfully claim the state secrets privilege, and a DOJ commitment to 
provide periodic reports to congressional oversight committees on cases in 
which the government has asserted the privilege.98 
To be clear, pending and future litigation was not the only impetus for 
the Obama Administration’s decision to alter its state secrets policy.  
Several members of Congress pressured the Administration to decrease its 
use of the privilege.  Even before the Ninth Circuit panel rejected the 
Administration’s invocation of the privilege, the Administration had 
established a task force to review the executive’s use of the privilege.  
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit panel decision, which firmly rejected the 
privilege in that case, very likely increased the pressure on the government 
to rework the procedures it would employ before invoking the privilege.  
Even the district judge who heard the Jeppesen case at the trial level and 
who upheld the government’s use of the privilege reflected concern during 
oral argument about the use of the state secrets privilege to suppress a case 
involving civil liberties.99 
As a result, the executive had multiple audiences for this policy shift, 
including Congress and some of the president’s constituents.  Another 
audience was the courts:  the executive surely intended this policy shift to 
affect judicial reactions to future executive assertions of the privilege.  And 
it has had this effect.  In a decision issued after the September 2009 policy 
change, then-Chief Judge Royce Lamberth articulated misgivings about 
approving a settlement in a long-running CIA-related case because he 
believed that the government originally acted inappropriately in invoking 
the privilege.100  He also was concerned that no U.S. officials would be held 
 
April 28, 2009, see Jeppesen I, 579 F.3d at 943, and its en banc decision on September 8, 
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Torture Flights, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2008), http://origin.mercurynews.com/
breakingnews/ci_8176582. 
 100. Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2010). 
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responsible for the underlying wrongdoing.101  He nevertheless found it 
“encouraging” that the Attorney General had issued new guidelines for the 
proper use of the privilege, which the court “applaud[ed].”102  The court 
attached the Attorney General’s policy as an appendix to its decision.103 
Likewise, in Jeppesen, the Ninth Circuit cited the new procedures in 
reaching its conclusion that the government had not invoked the privilege to 
“avoid embarrassment or to escape scrutiny.”104  The new policy thus 
clearly played a role in subsequent court decisions, though it is impossible 
to determine that the policy change directly caused the outcome.  The 
executive branch has cited the policy itself in litigation:  the DOJ attached 
the Attorney General’s guidelines as an exhibit to its motion for summary 
judgment in the Al-Aulaqi case, in which it invoked the state secrets 
privilege.105  Doing so reflects an interest in ensuring that the court is aware 
of the government’s self-imposed restraints on the policy’s use. 
c.  Secret Evidence in Immigration Proceedings 
The observer effect is not limited to the post–September 11 world.  For 
example, since the 1950s the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
has sought to use secret evidence to support its decisions to deport aliens 
and legal permanent residents or to deny asylum to noncitizens.106  In 1999 
and 2000, several administrative and court rulings rejected the agency’s use 
of such evidence.  In at least one such case, the DOJ declined to pursue 
deportation, even though the government had a reasonable chance of 
winning its case on appeal.107  Indeed, the government altered its practices 
and procedures in response to these judicial critiques of its use of secret 
evidence.108  The FBI General Counsel testified that the DOJ instituted 
internal procedures to ensure that the government only used classified 
evidence when it was “necessary to adequately serve the national 
interest.”109  He stated that the DOJ was establishing guidelines and 
regulations to regularize and improve the process of using classified 
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information in court, and that the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney 
General were personally involved in the efforts.110  The more rigorous 
internal review continued even after the courts of appeals vacated the 
critical district court rulings on appeal or criticized those rulings in ancillary 
proceedings.111 
3.  Publicizing Policy 
A third type of pressure imposed by the observer effect prompts the 
executive to reveal nonpublic executive policies and, in doing so, try to 
attest to its own responsible behavior.  Once the policies are widely 
available, foreign governments, NGOs, and legal scholars can assess and 
debate them.112  The disclosure provides a baseline against which courts 
and the public may evaluate future executive behavior and challenge that 
behavior when it appears to countermand the stated policy.113  Of course, 
these disclosures are self-serving; they reflect an executive calculation that 
these policy revelations are likely to benefit the executive’s case at a 
manageable cost.  And not all litigation leads to disclosure:  in some cases, 
being sued causes government officials to be more cautious than usual 
about making public statements on issues implicated by the litigation.  
Nevertheless, the executive has revealed a number of policies under the 
influence of the observer effect. 
The government’s decision to reveal publicly the process by which it 
determines when and how to transfer military detainees to other countries 
serves as an example.114  Initially, the government transferred people from 
Guantánamo to other countries without publicly explaining the standards 
and process by which it conducted those transfers.  The government had not 
revealed when it sought diplomatic assurances that receiving countries 
would not mistreat the detainees; when it sought security assurances (by 
which a receiving country agreed to take measures to ensure that a 
transferred detainee would not undertake dangerous activities); and which 
government officials were involved in the process.115 
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When detainees facing transfers from Guantánamo sued the government 
to block those transfers, this lack of transparency hurt the government’s 
ability to defend its policies in court.116  Therefore, the government decided 
to file several affidavits from Defense and State Department officials that 
described the process.117  These affidavits explained the consultations and 
internal deliberations that take place within the government and with 
foreign governments when assessing whether an individual is more likely 
than not to face torture if transferred to a particular country.118  The 
affidavits also identified which states had accepted detainees from U.S. 
custody.119 
Through this disclosure, the government presumably hoped to persuade 
the courts that it had in place a thorough process to ensure that the United 
States did not expose detainees to likely mistreatment in the receiving 
country.  The government ultimately convinced the D.C. Circuit that the 
thirty-day stays imposed by several district courts were improper, based in 
part on its representations to the court about its internal procedures.120  In 
any case, the government’s disclosures about its internal policies remain in 
place and allow the public to evaluate a process of which it previously was 
aware in only very general terms. 
In addition, several cases have prompted the government to identify 
which set of individuals it deems detainable in particular armed conflicts, 
even though no court specifically ordered the government to do so.  
Litigation in March 2009121 directly led the government to clarify its 
claimed scope of detention at Guantánamo, but the observer effect seems to 
have led the government to extend that definition to those detainable in 
Afghanistan as well.122  Notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion in 
Al Maqaleh that four detainees held by the United States in Afghanistan 
lacked constitutional habeas rights, some modest ambiguity remains about 
the court’s reach over U.S. detainees in Afghanistan.  By providing clarity 
about who the government claimed it could detain in Afghanistan, it 
foreclosed one potential avenue of litigation by detainees held in 
Afghanistan.  The government may have concluded that issuing a clear and 
public policy about its scope of claimed detention authority would give 
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courts comfort that the claimed authority was cabined—and cabined in 
ways that the courts blessed in the Guantánamo context. 
Similarly, the government decided to discuss publicly certain details 
about the legal standards it employs to determine when it may target a U.S. 
citizen overseas using lethal force.  In Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, Anwar Al-
Aulaqi’s father sought an injunction prohibiting the government from 
intentionally killing his son unless the son presented a concrete, imminent 
threat and there were no other means to suppress the threat.123  Even though 
Judge John Bates held for the government, he expressed significant 
discomfort with the idea that the government was required to obtain court 
authorization to wiretap an American’s phone conversations overseas, but 
need not do so before using lethal force against him.124  Although the 
government won, the executive disregards at its peril a careful opinion by a 
well-respected judge that expresses grave concerns about a government 
policy.  As discussed infra, Attorney General Eric Holder later gave a 
speech detailing the legal arguments and basic processes by which the 
United States determined when it was lawful to target members of al Qaeda, 
including those who are American citizens.125  Of course, a public speech 
such as Holder’s has multiple intended audiences, of which the courts are 
just one.  This disclosure of internal procedures, however, like the 
disclosure of internal transfer policies, may represent an effort to assure 
courts of the level of attention such targeting decisions receive within the 
executive branch.126  This effort may be calculated to affect the outcome of 
additional, future litigation on targeting questions, litigation that seems 
quite likely. 
In short, the observer effect can prompt the government to establish, 
amend, or reveal national security policies.  The government does so with a 
view to avoiding—if possible—or prevailing in pending or likely future 
litigation.  Undertaking these policy shifts on its own accord allows the 
executive branch to retain what it sees as vital control over the shape of the 
policies, even if, as a result, the executive produces policies that are 
somewhat less assertive than it would prefer. 
C.  The National Security Distinction 
If the observer effect shapes the way in which the executive branch 
develops or modifies many of its national security policies, why doesn’t it 
impact U.S. policymaking in other areas of law?  In fact, it probably 
does.127  This Article focuses on one area of the law in which the observer 
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effect often obtains significant traction, without discounting the observer 
effect’s potential role elsewhere.  There are at least two reasons to think that 
the observer effect may be felt keenly in the national security area.  In 
addition, as Part III illustrates, the observer effect’s operation in this area is 
of particular interest because it plays an important checking function in the 
national security arena, where the executive often is seen as unfettered. 
1.  History of Deference 
Where the executive is used to receiving deference from the courts in a 
particular area of law, the executive grows accustomed to its freedom of 
operation.  The executive perceives judicial “intrusions” into this area as 
particularly unwelcome, and has strong incentives to preserve the status 
quo.  Ironically, this may cause the executive to act with particular 
flexibility in setting and amending policy, in response to perceived looming 
court participation in this area of decisionmaking.  If the executive alters its 
policy in a manner that persuades courts to continue to defer to it 
(jurisdictionally or on the merits), the executive is able to preserve that area 
of operations as relatively untouched by courts.  Although intuition might 
suggest that the executive would be disinclined to amend its policies in an 
area in which courts traditionally have limited their involvement, the 
opposite is true:  the executive is particularly prone to the observer effect in 
this area. 
National security and wartime activities are areas in which courts’ 
involvement historically has been limited.128  In earlier wars, 
the President determined when, how, and where to surveil, target, detain, 
transfer, and interrogate enemy soldiers, often without public knowledge, 
and almost entirely without unwanted legal interference from within the 
executive branch itself or from the other branches of government. . . . 
[N]ever before has the Commander in Chief been so influenced, and 
constrained, by law.129 
Others concur that the courts’ approach to national security cases after 
September 11 differed dramatically from their pre–September 11 
approach.130  This history of deference to the executive in national security 
cases means that there are more likely to be triggering events that shock the 
system.  It also means that the executive is particularly sensitive—because 
it is not acclimated—to judicial review in this area. 
Relatedly, conventional wisdom and the holdings in several high-profile, 
historical cases suggest that the executive tends to receive a broad degree of 
deference when the courts choose to review national security policies on the 
 
keenly aware of the impending (and near-certain) judicial review and set their policies 
accordingly. See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification:  Rethinking Recent 
Proposals To Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
483, 499–502 (1997). 
 128. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 469. 
 129. GOLDSMITH, supra note 19, at 207–08. 
 130. Deborah Pearlstein, After Deference:  Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign 
Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 800 (2011); Scheppele, supra note 3, at 92. 
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merits.131  Where the executive generally receives a broad degree of 
deference, courts will be willing to uphold a wider range of executive 
policy choices.  This, in turn, suggests that where an executive is otherwise 
in a position to respond to the observer effect,132 the executive has a greater 
variety of alternative policy options available to it if it seeks to adjust its 
policies to fend off court involvement.  In contrast, where the executive 
receives only limited deference from the courts, it generally will have to 
choose among a narrower range of policy options that might satisfy the 
court.  It therefore has less flexibility to shift its policy to a position that 
persuades the court to defer or uphold the policy on the merits.  In the 
national security realm, in contrast, there may be several different policy 
amendments that the executive could effect to respond to the observer 
effect, in an attempt to avoid a loss on the merits.  This is another reason the 
observer effect operates robustly in the national security area. 
2.  Ease of Policy Change 
An important aspect of the observer effect is the executive branch’s 
ability to establish and amend policies relatively quickly.  This is not to say 
that the levers of government operate with great alacrity in the national 
security area (though on occasion they can).  Rather, the claim is that the 
executive functions with relatively greater freedom in setting and changing 
national security policies than it does in other policy areas, such as those 
that implicate environmental or workplace safety issues. 
First, in the national security arena the executive is not hindered by the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an important statutory restriction on 
executive policymaking and policy alteration.133  Requiring agencies to 
work through extensive procedures before enacting new rules has led to 
“ossification,” preventing agencies from regulating effectively and 
efficiently.134  The APA, however, contains several carve-outs in the 
national security area.135  These include a provision exempting from APA 
procedures “courts martial and military commissions” and “military 
authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory.”136  
APA sections 553 and 554 exempt “military or foreign affairs functions” 
from rulemaking and adjudication procedures.137  As a result, most national 
security policies are not subject to the APA’s time-consuming strictures and 
do not directly invite judicial review. 
 
 131. See infra Part III.A (discussing “degrees” of deference). 
 132. See infra Part II.B. 
 133. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 134. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Comment:  Rule-Making Ossification—A Modest 
Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 453 (1997). 
 135. Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism As Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 
887, 925 (2012) (“[T]he generally applicable law of administrative procedure is unavailable 
or weakly constraining as applied to security agencies.”). 
 136. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(F)–(G) (2006). 
 137. Id. §§ 553(a)(1), 554(a)(4). 
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Second, although in theory Congress may insert itself into the 
policymaking process—including by legislating directly or by conducting 
oversight hearings—it faces a number of hurdles to doing so.  As Aziz Huq 
notes, “Terrorism is a subject matter that is especially prone to legislative 
delegation because it often entails hard trade-offs.  Post-9/11 legislation 
generally leaves large discretion in executive hands.  For example, when 
fashioning substitutes for habeas corpus, Congress left open both 
substantive and procedural rules.”138  In addition to this delegation, 
congressional oversight mechanisms have not proven particularly robust.139  
The president may limit executive reporting to Congress by interpreting 
particular statutory terms narrowly, as he seems to have done with the term 
“hostilities” in the War Powers Resolution.140  Congressional reports on 
national security issues tend to emerge years after the fact and thus have 
limited impact on policy setting that must take place quickly. 
As a result, even where Congress has enacted a framework statute such 
as the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force141 or the Military 
Commissions Act of 2009,142 many specific policies in the national security 
area are made with limited input from Congress or affected 
nongovernmental entities.  The speed with which these policies are crafted 
and publicized is limited by internal bureaucratic requirements and political 
will, which are non-negligible factors.  But on a relative basis the executive 
remains more nimble in setting and changing national security policy than 
in other substantive areas and so may be particularly responsive to the 
observer effect in this context. 
II.  DISSECTING THE OBSERVER EFFECT 
Part I identified the observer effect and introduced real-world evidence of 
its operation.  This Part explores how the observer effect operates, including 
how it affects both policy processes and policy content.  It also describes 
factors that maximize the observer effect.  In dissecting the effect’s 
mechanics, this part draws from scholarship on the dialogic relationship 
between different branches of government to explore how courts and the 
executive engage in a dialogue with each other about their views on 
acceptable—and “off-limits”—national security policies.  This dialogue 
plays an important role when the executive shapes those policies under the 
influence of the observer effect. 
 
 138. Huq, supra note 135, at 923. 
 139. Id. at 926 (“The history of sua sponte congressional oversight of national security 
affairs indeed suggests that congressional attention to counterterrorism will be weaker than 
in other domains.”). 
 140. Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 
50 Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 539, 612 (2012). 
 141. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 142. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t (2006). 
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A.  Second-Order Effects 
The operation of the observer effect affects both the processes by which 
the executive arrives at those altered policies and the substance of the 
resulting policies.  Many of these second-order effects are double edged.  
Those who favor relatively greater judicial deference and executive 
independence in the national security arena will object to many of these 
effects.  Those who view courts’ involvement in these cases as critical to 
curtailing the executive’s infringement of individual rights will tend to see 
these second-order effects as positive. 
1.  Policy Processes 
When the observer effect is in play, executive officials find themselves 
forced to consider whether to establish particular policies (some of which 
may have been contemplated but not resolved for years), or to revisit 
policies that already are in place.  The external pressure brought to bear by 
the observer effect therefore sets in motion various internal processes within 
the executive branch machinery. 
a.  Rushed Policymaking 
Litigation-driven policymaking forces the executive to make decisions 
quickly, when taking more time might result in a more considered policy.  
If the executive decides to respond to the pendency of litigation by making 
a policy change, the timeline for developing and assessing policy options is 
finite.  Filing deadlines drive policymaking timelines.  Time pressure may 
mean that the executive fails to consider the full range of policy options.  It 
also may lead the executive to craft a policy that is internally inconsistent, 
produces unintended consequences, or fails to resolve the perceived 
problem. 
On the other hand, indefinite time does not always produce the best 
policy.  In some cases, too much time leads to bureaucratic gridlock or 
excessively complicated policies.  In other cases, litigation pressures may 
prompt the executive to finalize a policy that has long been under 
consideration among agencies or to focus on an issue that has languished 
due to the press of other business.  Only when the executive responds to the 
observer effect during the pendency of litigation will it face filing deadlines.  
From the perspective of litigants, court deadlines may be just the thing to 
light a fire under the executive’s decisionmaking process and to prompt the 
executive to craft a more rights-protective policy. 
b.  Interagency Power Shifts 
The observer effect shifts power from some players within the executive 
to others.143  In particular, the effect entails a partial shift in power away 
 
 143. Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal 
Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359 (2013). 
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from intelligence agencies and the State and Defense Departments toward 
the DOJ, which has the greatest expertise in interpreting court decisions and 
in predicting future judicial behavior. 
Some (nonjudicial) audiences may find this shift troubling.  For national 
security issues that implicate international law, including the laws of war, 
the Departments of State and Defense have longstanding interpretive 
expertise and in many cases negotiated the applicable treaty language.  A 
phenomenon that shifts policy-setting power away from those expert 
agencies may be worrying.  From a “good government” point of view, there 
also is something intuitively unsettling about allowing litigation to drive 
government policymaking:  it suggests that the government is seeking not 
the “best” policy, but only one that will survive judicial review. 
Others may find this shift appealing.  Ultimately, the observer effect 
works to shift executive policies closer to the courts’ comfort zone.  The 
DOJ is best suited institutionally to predict where that zone is and how 
courts (and specific judges) may respond to a given policy.144  In the 
national security context, where the executive has strong incentives to adopt 
security-driven policies, it is unreasonable to expect the executive often to 
produce policies that exceed—from an individual rights perspective—what 
the courts will require.  Thus, from this perspective, it is only natural that 
the DOJ will play a powerful role in national security policy setting by 
virtue of its litigation expertise.145 
c.  Presidential Energy 
The observer effect may force the president (or cabinet members) to 
spend time understanding complex litigation.  Not all triggering events will 
require presidential attention, of course.  But to the extent that triggering 
events—or dialogic language from a court in a prior case—lead the 
executive to implement systemic, high-level policy changes, the president 
and his cabinet usually need to understand the context in which the policy 
arises, how the policy currently operates, and the judicial activity that has 
influenced the proposed policy changes.  Given the president’s limited time 
and consistently overburdened agenda, requiring the president to absorb and 
decide any additional set of complicated issues flowing from litigation 
means that he will spend less time on other important topics.  On the other 
hand, when the litigation in question implicates some of the most profound 
and contestable national security issues in decades, there is good reason to 
expect—and, for purposes of political accountability, demand—that the 
president and his cabinet make these types of decisions. 
 
 144. As the Rasul example suggests, the DOJ sometimes may become overly wed to a 
particular view of presidential powers that hinders its ability to forecast properly where 
courts are likely to come out on particular issues. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); 
supra note 34. 
 145. The DOJ has independent, substantive national security equities as well, by virtue of 
its role in prosecuting national security–related cases. 
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2.  Policy Content 
Just as the observer effect alters policy processes within the executive 
branch, the effect impacts the substance of the policies that emerge from 
these internal executive branch processes.  In general, the observer effect 
will lead the executive to pay somewhat greater attention to the implications 
for individual rights of a particular policy, while potentially allowing the 
government to leave unresolved the outer boundaries of its claimed 
authorities. 
a.  Policymaking Under Uncertainty 
Consider how the executive makes policy in the wake of a specific court 
decision:  in most cases, the decision gives the executive detailed guidance 
about the constitutional or statutory provisions at issue.  The executive still 
must undertake some level of interpretation (both of the legal texts and of 
the court’s opinion), but there is judicial language on hand to guide the 
executive in revising its policies.  In contrast, when the executive makes 
policy decisions pursuant to the observer effect, either in the face of 
pending litigation or in anticipation of possible litigation, the executive is 
forced to make educated guesses about what policies will satisfy the courts 
(or at least what policy content will persuade the courts not to intervene).  
The dearth of national security law doctrine can make this task particularly 
challenging. 
Developing policy under uncertainty poses a risk that the executive will 
overcorrect, establishing policies that are insufficiently attentive to national 
security imperatives.  Given the widespread understanding that the 
president (and Congress) have incentives to produce policies that favor 
security over rights protections, however, this risk seems limited.146  
Policymaking under uncertainty poses the opposite risk as well:  that the 
executive will undercorrect and face time-consuming litigation, 
notwithstanding its policy shifts.  This litigation both imposes a resource 
drain on the government and exposes the government to a reasonable 
likelihood that a court will strike down its policy.  The risk of 
undercorrection is a more robust one, and examples such as the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals and its litigation aftermath should serve to remind 
the government of the perils of misgauging judicial signals. 
b.  Minimizing Adverse Precedent 
Litigants who challenge an executive national security policy may see the 
observer effect as leading to two undesirable outcomes.  First, if the 
executive shifts a policy mid-litigation, the shift may moot the case or 
prompt the court to hold for the government on the merits.  Either outcome 
is desirable from the executive’s perspective but undesirable for litigants, 
 
 146. See Huq, supra note 135, at 929–31 (describing systematic incentives of both the 
executive and Congress to favor aggressive security policies). 
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because each reduces the likelihood that the courts will establish precedent 
adverse to the government.  Second, even if the litigants find the new 
executive policy more tolerable than the prior policy, the litigants may 
believe that, absent the policy change, the courts would have forced the 
executive to establish an even more favorable policy (in the litigants’ view) 
on the merits.  Thus, the policy shifts engendered by the observer effect 
may leave litigants dissatisfied, notwithstanding the overall “improvement” 
to the policy. 
There may be a broader reason to be concerned about this type of policy 
resolution as well.  To the extent that the observer effect stimulates the 
government to alter policies before a final court resolution of the case, this 
may lead to less overall transparency about the content of those policies.  
For example, in Padilla v. Hanft, the Court granted certiorari to consider 
whether the executive lawfully could detain as an enemy combatant a U.S. 
citizen picked up on U.S. soil.147  The Court later dismissed the case on 
jurisdictional grounds, but signaled discomfort with Padilla’s detention.148  
When the case threatened to come back before the Court after Padilla 
refiled his case in the proper venue, the executive unsealed a criminal 
indictment against him and transferred him to civilian custody.149  In short, 
the observer effect and judicial messaging prompted the executive to moot 
the case and leave unresolved questions about the propriety of such 
detentions.150  While this approach produces fewer direct clashes between 
the executive and the courts, it may allow the government to turn the (legal, 
if not public) spotlight away from some of its most controversial policies. 
For the same reasons that litigants see disadvantages in reducing the 
amount of precedent, the executive will favor this result.  The executive will 
have avoided having to alter a policy to the court’s specifications, limited 
the reputational costs that flow from having a policy struck down, and 
reduced the amount of time its agencies must devote to managing the 
litigation.  It also will reduce the executive’s long-term concerns about 
 
 147. Padilla v. Hanft, 540 U.S. 1173 (2004). 
 148. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006); see Steve Vladeck, Online Alexander Bickel 
Symposium:  The Passive Virtues As Means, Not Ends, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 21, 2012, 12:32 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/online-alexander-bickel-symposium-the-passive-
virtues-as-means-not-ends/. 
 149. See Vladeck, supra note 148. 
 150. The case of Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri provides a comparable example.  In 2001, the 
FBI arrested al-Marri in Illinois and charged him with various criminal offenses. See Al-
Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2007).  The Bush Administration decided to 
classify him as an unlawful enemy combatant and place him in military detention. See id. at 
164–65.  His habeas corpus case made its way through the federal courts, with the Supreme 
Court granting certiorari in late 2008. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 555 U.S. 1066 (2008).  On 
coming into office, President Obama ordered a review of al-Marri’s case. Press Release, The 
White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Review of the Detention of Ali Saleh Kahlah al-
Marri (Jan. 22, 2009).  The DOJ charged him in federal court and he pled guilty, mooting the 
case before the Supreme Court. See Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Al-Marri 
Detention Case Vacated (Mar. 6, 2009), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/
resource/al_marri_detention_case_vacated/.  Though happy with the outcome, some civil 
liberties groups bemoaned the fact that the Court did not clarify the limits of the executive’s 
detention power. See id. 
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having restraining precedent on the books, the language of which litigants 
undoubtedly will employ in similar (and even unrelated) future cases 
against the government. 
c.  Reducing the Security Focus 
The observer effect provides an important counterweight to the 
executive’s instinct to prioritize national security equities at the expense of 
individual rights because the executive knows that the courts may be a 
future audience for its policies.  A primary reason to be concerned about 
allowing the executive to completely dominate national security 
decisionmaking is the fear that the executive will conduct skewed risk 
assessments, overstate the threat that the country faces, and establish 
excessively draconian policies as a result.151  As Cass Sunstein suggests, 
“[T]he President has a strong incentive to take precautions even if they are 
excessive and even unconstitutional.”152 
Ensuring some level of ambiguity about whether a court will step in to 
review a particular policy helps counteract that bias.  Christina Wells notes 
that the “lack of predictability regarding a court’s approach . . . should force 
the executive to consider that the possibility of rigorous judicial review is 
very real.”153  In her view, advance knowledge of the existence of judicial 
review can force the executive to assume some “pre-decisional awareness 
of accountability.”154  That is, when the executive understands that it likely 
will be forced to explain its reasoning after the fact for particular security 
policies it adopts, it will think more carefully ex ante about what those 
policies should be and weigh a greater number of alternatives.155  While 
this element has procedural aspects to it—forcing a more careful and 
considered process of adopting policy—it also has important substantive 
effects.  Assuming that courts as a rule will favor policies that are more 
rights protective than those favored by the executive, this perception of 
future judicial oversight will shift the substantive policy in a more rights-
sensitive direction.156 
 
 151. See David Cole, No Reason To Believe:  Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power, and 
Constitutional Constraint, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1335 (2008) (“Precisely because we rely 
so heavily on the executive to maintain our security, we should be skeptical of its ability to 
give sufficient weight to the liberty side of the balance.”); Christina E. Wells, Questioning 
Deference, 69 MO. L. REV. 903, 929 (2004). But see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, 
TERROR IN THE BALANCE:  SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 30 (2007) (“There is no 
reason to think that the government will systematically undervalue civil liberties or 
overvalue security during emergencies nor that it will systematically overestimate the 
magnitude of a threat.”). 
 152. Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 53. 
 153. Wells, supra note 151, at 942. 
 154. Id. at 940. 
 155. Id. at 944. 
 156. The current habeas corpus jurisprudence in the D.C. Circuit stands as an important 
exception to this point.  In the Guantánamo detainee habeas cases, the D.C. Circuit has 
upheld virtually all of the executive branch’s policy and factual decisions about detention.  
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than it has required of itself. See Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1077–78  (D.C. Cir. 
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B.  Maximizing the Observer Effect 
Part I described various manifestations of the observer effect in the 
national security arena.  Each of those examples, however, emerges from a 
complicated political and bureaucratic ecosystem.  Various factors in that 
ecosystem influence how robustly the observer effect reveals itself in any 
particular case.  This section identifies factors that strengthen or weaken the 
effect. 
1.  Public Attention 
It is a truism that issues attracting public attention and debate draw the 
attention of executive policymakers as well, especially where the 
executive’s current approach to those issues has produced negative 
congressional and media reactions.  The observer effect amplifies the 
reasons that the executive will be inclined to alter its policies.  The premise 
of the observer effect is that the executive responds to certain or probable 
judicial attention to its national security policies by attempting to ensure 
that those policies will survive (or deter) judicial scrutiny.  As the executive 
knows, courts are attuned to popular discourse.157  Thus, when entities such 
as Congress, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), journalists, human 
rights groups, or national security “hawks” already have begun to scrutinize 
and criticize those policies, the executive reasonably surmises that the 
courts are aware of this public criticism.  As a result, the executive is more 
likely to perceive that a court may intervene, especially when the courts 
sense a shift in the public’s (and, importantly, the elite’s) views on an 
issue.158  Because the executive is aware that courts can mandate specific 
policy changes in a way that the public cannot, the executive may be just as 
conscious of the elite’s influence on court preferences as it is of the direct 
influence of the elite on its own decisionmaking.  Where public criticism 
appears pervasive enough to alter judicial preferences, the executive is 
prone to feel the observer effect more keenly. 
2.  Interagency Disputes 
The executive is more likely to heed the observer effect and alter an 
existing policy if one or more entities within the executive branch are 
dissatisfied with that policy.  If members of an interested executive agency 
 
2011) (Silberman, J., concurring) (stating that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard 
that the government had supported was too constraining); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 
1102, 1104–05 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (same); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (contesting executive’s view that international law constrained its interpretation of the 
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force). 
 157. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009) (viewing the justices and the 
public as in a marriage that bypasses Congress and the executive); Barry Friedman, Dialogue 
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 643 (1993) (“What courts do is similar to the 
task performed by other governmental bodies—they give voice to constituencies under 
certain circumstances.”). 
 158. See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, 
Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515 (2010). 
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believe that the government has struck the wrong policy balance (because, 
for example, the policy preserves excessive flexibility for the government), 
the shadow of a judicial presence gives those agency officials who favor a 
more modest balancing an additional arrow in their quiver as they argue 
their position.159  That is, during interagency policy discussions, those 
members are likely to invoke the idea that the government either must 
adjust the policy balance or face a greater chance of having the policy 
overturned.  Those officials will argue that it is in the executive’s interest to 
retain control of the policy’s contours, rather than face a less satisfying 
policy imposed unilaterally by a court. 
In contrast, if all officials within the government believe that the 
executive has struck the appropriate liberty-security balance in a national 
security policy, there are likely to be few advocates for a policy 
readjustment, notwithstanding the presence of the observer effect.  In these 
cases, the executive may prefer to live with the risk that a court may strike 
down or modify its policy rather than to alter its policy in advance. 
3.  Modest Transaction, Financial, and Political Costs 
Changing an existing executive policy usually requires the affected 
agencies to hold extended discussions, draft background papers, prepare 
multiple iterations of the new policy, and obtain approval from agency 
heads.160  These are some of the “bureaucratic costs” of enacting or 
changing a policy.  In addition, policy changes may incur financial costs, as 
where the policy change requires additional personnel or new physical 
structures.  Stark changes in policy may also reopen litigation on settled 
issues or prompt a loud congressional or public outcry.  Where the 
bureaucratic, financial, and political costs of making a particular policy 
change are manageable, the observer effect will be relatively robust.  In 
contrast, where the costs of altering the policy are extremely high—even 
where there is a triggering case and an interagency dispute about a 
particular policy—the observer effect is unlikely to shift that policy. 
Consider an example of countervailing political incentives that operate to 
minimize executive policy shifts:  the high costs of releasing detainees.  To 
release a detainee from Guantánamo is politically costly because of the 
chance, however remote, that the detainee will undertake future terrorist 
activities.  The political cost exists even where the executive branch has 
determined that the individual poses a relatively limited threat to the United 
States and its allies.  Even where the observer effect might compel the 
executive not to contest some of the stronger detainee habeas petitions, the 
executive has competing incentives to try to shift the cost of release onto 
 
 159. See Martin, supra note 37, at 155 (“[T]he mere prospect of court review greatly 
enhances the bargaining position of those within the agency who wish to adopt tighter 
standards, closer supervision, or more protective procedures.”). 
 160. See Ingber, supra note 143, at 369–72 (describing various executive branch 
decisionmaking processes). 
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the courts.161  Where such political costs are present, it is difficult to predict 
the extent to which the observer effect will manifest itself, if at all. 
C.  Interbranch Dialogue 
As previously discussed, the observer effect can prompt the executive to 
change a policy without a court saying a word about that policy, particularly 
when the factors in Part II.B are present.162  But in other situations, courts 
can say a word (or several) about a particular policy.  When courts hear 
cases on the merits or when justices issue statements related to denials of 
certiorari, they have the opportunity to initiate a dialogue with the 
executive—whether or not the courts ultimately defer to the executive’s 
position.  That dialogue allows the courts to gesture at acceptable and 
unacceptable policy choices, while the executive gauges which policies to 
adopt and how large of a “cushion” to build into those policies to avoid 
future adverse decisions.163 
Some scholars and judges have critiqued the practice by which a court 
provides advice or guidance on issues that are not directly related to the 
case before it.164  Other scholars promote the virtues of judicial advice 
giving.  Neal Katyal argues for a “proactive theory of judging under which 
the Justices may recommend courses of action to provide advice, clarify 
constitutional issues, or shine light on particular matters.”165  It is easy to 
envision reasons to be skeptical of a robust use of judicial advice giving in 
all contexts.  In situations in which courts are likely to defer systematically 
to the executive, however, their use of opinions and related tools as vehicles 
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897 (2009) (reviewing WITTES, supra note 1) (noting that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
this area contain “implicit guidance to the political branches on how to avoid more serious 
confrontations”). 
 164. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution:  Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1253 (2006) (urging caution about undue uses of dicta, but also noting that dicta 
“can help lawyers and society to predict the future course of the court’s rulings”); Abner J. 
Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers:  A Response to Professor Neal Katyal, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1825 (1998).  For a broader discussion of minimalism, see Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Supreme Court 1995 Term Foreword:  Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
6, 6–8 (1996). 
 165. Katyal, supra note 163, at 1711. 
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to provide guidance—including notes of caution—to the executive is an 
important way to influence and cabin national security policies. 
Between 2004 and 2008, the Supreme Court was relatively active in 
patrolling Guantánamo cases, perhaps “because of its awareness that it was 
engaged in a dialogue with the elected branches of government and that its 
decisions would not be the final word in the dialogue.”166  What exactly is 
the purpose of this “dialogue”?  Does it run only from the courts to the 
executive, or is the executive also in “dialogue” with the courts?  And how 
does this dialogue relate to the observer effect? 
1.  Court Messaging 
In an area such as national security, where deference is the norm, one 
might expect courts to say little about the underlying executive policy in 
question.  In fact, they regularly have offered warnings and guidance, both 
explicit and implicit, even as they defer.  In many recent cases, the courts 
have laid down markers indicating that the executive should consider 
certain policy choices to be off limits.167  For instance, in a case in which 
two American citizens held by U.S. forces in Iraq challenged their 
impending transfer to the Iraqi government, the Court was willing to let the 
transfer proceed because the executive assured the Court that it was U.S. 
policy not to transfer an individual where torture is likely to result.168  The 
Court distinguished that case from a “more extreme case in which the 
executive has determined that a detainee is likely to be tortured but decides 
to transfer him anyway.”169  In his concurrence, Justice David Souter put a 
finer point on it, stating: 
[N]othing in today’s opinion should be read as foreclosing relief for a 
citizen of the United States who resists transfer, say, from the American 
military to a foreign government for prosecution in a case of that sort, and 
I would extend the caveat to a case in which the probability of torture is 
well documented, even if the Executive fails to acknowledge it. . . .  [I]f 
the political branches did favor transfer it would be in order to ask 
whether substantive due process bars the Government from consigning its 
own people to torture.170 
Similarly, the Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld171 ruled out indefinite 
detention for the purposes of interrogation, even though that fact pattern 
was not before the Court.172  The D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh held for the 
government in declining to extend constitutional habeas rights to detainees 
 
 166. Roach, supra note 112, at 144–45. 
 167. For court signaling to have an effect, the executive must perceive a credible 
likelihood of future litigation over a policy directly or loosely linked to that signaling 
language. 
 168. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008). 
 169. Id. at 702. 
 170. Id. at 706 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 514 
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reiterating Munaf’s caution about the “more extreme case”). 
 171. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 172. Id. at 521.  The Solicitor General, however, had defended this type of detention in 
the U.S. government’s brief. See id. at 520. 
866 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
in Afghanistan, but indicated that it would be concerned if the government 
brought detainees into active combat zones for the purpose of evading 
judicial review.173  This language left executive officials unsure about 
whether a court would exercise habeas jurisdiction in such a case. 
Even denials of certiorari may provide a forum for judicial messaging.  In 
his concurrence to the denial of certiorari in Padilla v. Hanft,174 Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, writing for himself, Chief Justice John Roberts, and 
Justice John Paul Stevens, implied that the Court would step in to hear the 
case if the executive, which had shifted Padilla from military custody to 
civilian custody, redetained Padilla as an enemy combatant.175  When the 
Court denied certiorari in Boumediene v. Bush176 in 2007, Justices Stevens 
and Kennedy made clear that they were attuned to the possibility that the 
Detainee Treatment Act’s remedies might prove inadequate or that the 
government might unreasonably delay the proceedings or otherwise 
prejudice the petitioners’ position.177  In such a case, they stated, 
“alternative means exist for us to consider our jurisdiction over the 
allegations made by petitioners before the Court of Appeals.”178 
Courts may signal the executive in both nondeference and deference 
cases, and they may do so explicitly or implicitly.  In Rasul v. Bush, for 
instance, the Court issued a nondeferential procedural opinion, concluding 
that federal courts had jurisdiction under the habeas statute to hear petitions 
from Guantánamo detainees.179  Some interpreted that decision as providing 
an additional, though subtle, indication about the Court’s views on the 
merits.180 
In Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, Judge Bates issued a deferential opinion, 
concluding that standing problems and the political question doctrine 
precluded him from assessing whether the U.S. government lawfully could 
target an American citizen in Yemen.181  But Judge Bates made explicit his 
discomfort with the implications of his decision.182  It is hard to imagine 
that the executive failed to receive that signal, particularly because the 
 
 173. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98–99 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 174. 547 U.S. 1062 (2006). 
 175. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Particularly given that three justices would have 
granted certiorari, this certiorari denial sent a particularly strong signal to the executive about 
the costs of shifting Padilla out of federal court and back into military custody. 
 176. 549 U.S. 1328 (2007). 
 177. Id. at 1329 (Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., respecting denial of cert.) (citing Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). 
 180. See Martinez, supra note 3, at 1049 (treating Rasul as a procedural decision that 
“intentionally signals something about the Court’s view of the merits in a difficult case, 
while intentionally leaving those merits substantively unresolved”). 
 181. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 182. See id. at 8 (“Stark, and perplexing, questions readily come to mind, including the 
following:  How is it that judicial approval is required when the United States decides to 
target a U.S. citizen overseas for electronic surveillance, but that, according to defendants, 
judicial scrutiny is prohibited when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen 
overseas for death?”). 
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media, foreign governments, and NGOs already had begun to critique U.S. 
targeting decisions and the use of drones overseas. 
Indeed, Judge Bates’s decision likely helped spark internal executive 
discussions about whether to say more publicly about the process by which 
the executive decides when and how to target an American citizen.183  On 
March 5, 2012, Attorney General Holder outlined in general terms the 
process by which the executive makes this decision and the legal standards 
that govern U.S. actions.184  It is unclear whether the Attorney General’s 
disclosure will mitigate the impact of future litigation by persuading courts 
that they need not intervene when a future targeting case arises before them 
because the executive is following sufficient procedures.  In fact, the 
disclosure might inspire additional litigation by individuals who believe that 
they may be targeted or who seek access to underlying executive policy 
documents.  Either way, such a disclosure allows more informed public 
debate about an important national security policy. 
Some court messaging may be relatively specific and may appear in 
opinions, but courts have additional ways to signal general displeasure with 
government policies.  Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Jeppesen I)185 
offers an example of both direct and “penumbral” signaling.  In Jeppesen I, 
the Ninth Circuit upheld the U.S. government’s invocation of the state 
secrets privilege to block a suit by a former Guantánamo detainee who 
claimed the government tortured him.186  The court’s decision contained 
explicit language reflecting the difficulty of the case and stating that the use 
of the state secrets privilege to dismiss a case at the outset should be 
“rare.”187  In addition, the court ordered the government to pay the 
Jeppesen I plaintiffs’ legal costs, even though the plaintiffs had not 
requested that relief.188  Few could interpret this signal as anything but 
further evidence of the court’s displeasure about the executive’s underlying 
rendition policy—and its decision to invoke the state secrets privilege in the 
case. 
2.  Executive Messaging 
The executive tries to achieve at least four things when it undertakes the 
types of policy changes described in Part I.  First, by establishing 
procedures that look increasingly judicial in nature, it is trying to persuade 
the courts that it is not necessary for them to review these cases on the 
merits.  Second, if a court decides to hear a case on the merits, the executive 
wants to win that case by persuading the court of the legal soundness of the 
 
 183. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 184. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Speech at Northwestern University School of Law 
(Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-
1203051.html. 
 185. 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 186. Id. at 1092–93. 
 187. Id. at 1092. 
 188. Id. at 1093; see also Charlie Savage, Court Dismisses a Case Asserting Torture by 
C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at A1. 
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executive policy.  If a court accepts the executive’s arguments, the court 
preserves the realm of national security policymaking as a relatively “court-
free” zone.  Third, the executive is trying to give courts a credible public 
justification for leaving the issue in the hands of a more politically 
responsive branch.189  Fourth, given that national security doctrine is 
relatively undeveloped, the executive attempts to influence the standards of 
deference and related sets of rules that accompany and guide national 
security decisions on the merits. 
To achieve these goals, the executive needs to establish a policy that 
makes the courts comfortable enough that they are persuaded to defer to the 
executive.  At the same time, the executive is aware that judicial activism 
has costs for the judiciary.190  The executive, therefore, has flexibility on 
the margins to establish a policy that would be somewhat less rights 
protective than a court itself might require if considering the statute or 
treaty in a vacuum.  This is, in some ways, a game of chicken.191 
In considering the executive’s “signal” to it, a court is likely to take into 
account the formality and timing of the process through which the executive 
established the policy at issue.  As Matthew Stephenson has noted, courts 
may give an agency greater substantive latitude in its statutory 
interpretation when it adopts that interpretation using formal procedures.192  
 
 189. Jon D. Michaels, The Willingly Fettered Executive:  Presidential Spinoffs in 
National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801, 830 (2011) (“Political 
accountability no doubt helps legitimate executive primacy in military and foreign affairs 
and justifies in large part the judiciary’s deference to agency action.”). 
 190. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) (examining when 
judges withdraw from conflicts to protect the integrity and legitimacy of their institution). 
 191. This discussion loosely draws from game theory.  Some game theory literature 
models and studies interbranch interactions, including how the president anticipates the 
response of other actors. See de Figueiredo et al., supra note 25, at 208 (“[C]ourts also 
constrain the other players in separation-of-powers games.  Because judicial action shapes 
policy outcomes, Congress, the president, and agencies will anticipate court decisions, and 
the potential for judicial review will be taken into account during the law-making process.”); 
see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 13, at 41 (noting that if institutions are in a 
competitive rather than a cooperative posture, “signals might be a way for one institution to 
gain strategic advantages over its competitors, by suggesting a state of affairs that would 
discourage the other institutions from aggressively pursuing those interests”); Richard 
McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma:  Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 209, 224 (2009) (describing the game of “chicken”). 
 192. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect:  Textual Plausibility, 
Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 528, 530 (2006) (observing that courts often give an agency more substantive 
latitude when the agency promulgates an interpretive decision via an elaborate formal 
proceeding than when it announces its interpretation in a more informal context); see also 
Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 675 (2000) 
(noting that litigation positions unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative 
practice are not entitled to Chevron deference); Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating 
Deference:  The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 
1723, 1773 (2007) (“Deference should not be given where the interpretation is unsupported 
by any formal legal opinion generated by a relevant department or agency (but instead 
constitutes nothing more than an argument made by the Justice Department in the course of 
litigation) . . . .  In contrast, deference should be robust (though not binding) where the 
interpretation (1) reflects the considered legal opinion of the department or agency 
responsible for the treaty’s implementation and (2) there is no conflicting opinion from other 
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Courts may view quite differently an Executive Order issued by the 
president well in advance of a particular round of litigation and a Defense 
Department policy change announced during the pendency of litigation 
about that particular policy.193  The format in which the executive issues the 
policy can range from formal mechanisms such as Executive Orders, to 
legally binding but less visible measures such as affidavits in litigation, or 
to informal means such as speeches.  The public nature of the 
announcement can vary as well.  A policy announced by the president in a 
televised speech garners far more attention than a policy announced via 
court filing.  The format, timing, and nature of the policy are bound to 
affect the level of deference a court is willing to confer.  When the policy is 
in writing, signed by a senior executive official, and easily accessible to the 
public, those formal attributes suggest that the costs of altering that policy 
in the future will be higher, and thus an alteration is less likely to occur.  
These kinds of situations—where the executive has signaled to the courts a 
genuine commitment to the new policy—are more likely to receive 
deference from courts. 
D.  Alternative Explanations for Policy Shifts? 
The observer effect obviously is not the sole impetus for changes to 
executive policy.  As scholars long have recognized, multiple entities 
influence the executive, including Congress, the courts, bureaucratic 
experts, the press, and interest groups.194  To that list, one could add U.S. 
allies.  Proving what causes the executive to select or modify a particular 
policy is notoriously difficult, not the least because many factors and 
influences usually coalesce to produce a policy.  Jon Michaels has 
explained that “one can never be certain about policymakers’ true 
motivations and intentions, or whether there is anything approaching a 
singular purpose.”195  The same is true for many of the examples presented 
in Part I, and this Article argues that the observer effect has an important 
influence over policy development and changes, but it does not (and cannot, 
without additional evidence about internal government decisionmaking) 
 
departments or agencies also having a significant stake in the issue.”); Magill, supra note 51, 
at 888 (explaining that formalizing a policy illustrates more commitment by the agency to 
the stability of the policy and calls attention to it); Deborah N. Pearlstein, A Measure of 
Deference:  Justice Stevens from Chevron to Hamdan, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1063 (2010) 
(arguing that Justice Stevens was unwilling to accord the executive deference in Hamdan 
because the executive had not “shown its work” and had cut uniformed military out of the 
drafting of the Military Commissions Act). 
 193. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 1170, 1214–15 (2007) (“[U]nder current law, it is true that the executive 
sometimes will not receive deference when no formal procedure has preceded its decision.  
In the domain of foreign affairs, as elsewhere, it is certainly worth considering the possibility 
that a mere litigation position is not entitled to judicial deference or that the executive must 
state its views in some public place in advance of a particular controversy.”). 
 194. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 19 (describing the role of courts, Congress, human 
rights activists, journalists, and lawyers in regulating executive action); Elena Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2254 (2001). 
 195. Michaels, supra note 189, at 805 n.4. 
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claim that the effect alone causes those developments.  Nevertheless, by 
explicating one important influence on the executive as it sets its policy 
preferences, this Article lays the groundwork for additional, systematic 
research on executive policy development. 
To strengthen the causal claims in this Article, this section considers 
three other possible explanations for the policy changes discussed in Part 
I.B.  It argues that these other explanations do not account persuasively for 
those policy changes. 
1.  Congressional Pressure 
As political scientists have demonstrated, a strategic executive will be 
attuned not just to the judiciary as a potential audience for its policymaking, 
but also to Congress.  The executive accordingly will take into account 
potential congressional reactions to its policy decisions when finalizing 
those policies.  Perhaps, then, Congress is a key source of pressure on 
executive policymaking, leading the executive to alter or reveal various 
national security policies and procedures. 
Two facts indicate that Congress has played a modest role in shaping the 
national security policies discussed here.  First, the timing of the policy 
changes seems closely aligned with activity in courts, and seems unrelated 
to salient activity in Congress.  In many cases, Congress only became 
involved in cementing policy changes well after the executive already had 
made them on its own.  For instance, the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act 
effectively codified (with modest amendments) the Bush Administration’s 
2004 Combatant Status Review Tribunals.196  Congress has not legislated 
(or even threatened to legislate) to mandate particular review procedures for 
detainees in Afghanistan, the use of secret evidence in immigration 
proceedings, or the use of lethal force overseas against American citizens.  
In most of the examples considered in Part I, Congress has come late to the 
game, if it shows up on the field at all. 
Second, where Congress has chosen to legislate in the post–September 11 
era, it frequently has been more aggressively security focused and less 
rights focused than the executive.197  For instance, in 2007, the Senate 
passed a “Sense of the Senate,” by a 94-3 vote, opposing efforts to bring 
Guantánamo detainees to the United States, notwithstanding President 
George W. Bush’s interest in doing so.198  In the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Congress sought to require the 
executive to detain members of al Qaeda within a military detention 
paradigm rather than an Article III criminal paradigm.199  President 
Obama’s signing statement opposed that policy and triggered relevant 
 
 196. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 
(codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1 (2006)). 
 197. There are exceptions to this.  For example, certain members of Congress hoped to 
cabin the executive’s use of the state secrets doctrine. See infra note 308. 
 198. 153 CONG. REC. 19,719 (2007). 
 199. National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 
§§ 1021–22, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011). 
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waivers built into the legislation.200  It is hard to reconcile Congress’s 
security-driven preferences with policy shifts by the executive in more 
rights-protective directions.  It is possible that private consultations between 
some members of Congress and the executive have affected executive 
decisions to alter executive policy, but records of those discussions are not 
publicly available.  There even is evidence of situations in which members 
of Congress objected to rights-protective shifts in executive security 
policies shortly after the executive issued those policies.201  In short, it is 
hard to see, based on available direct and circumstantial evidence, that 
Congress has exercised a potent “observer effect” of its own over the 
executive in the national security arena. 
2.  International Pressure 
Many U.S. allies were highly critical (at least publicly) of the Bush 
Administration’s “war on terror” policies.  Lord Johan Steyn, one of the 
United Kingdom’s top Law Lords, famously described Guantánamo as a 
“legal black hole” in a public speech in November 2003.202  Several reports 
sponsored by the Council of Europe criticized the U.S. use of harsh 
interrogation techniques, renditions to third countries, and the use of the 
Guantánamo Bay facility to conduct long-term military detention.203  The 
United States unquestionably had to expend significant diplomatic energy 
responding to concerns and questions from allies about the legality and 
wisdom of its policies. 
There is little evidence, however, that the United States altered its 
approach to its conflict with al Qaeda or its use of renditions and the 
Guantánamo Bay facility as a result of allied interest or criticism.  It may be 
that those NATO member states that have forces in Afghanistan have had 
some influence on what U.S. detention procedures look like at Bagram Air 
Base, but few of those states conduct any detention operations of their own.  
This suggests that any influence they have over changes to detention 
procedure is relatively limited.  Furthermore, several of the policies that the 
executive altered in the past eight years were policies with very strong 
domestic aspects but limited international aspects, such as the use of the 
 
 200. Press Release, President Barack Obama, The White House, Office of the Press 
Sec’y, Statement by the President on H.R. 1540 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/31/statement-president-hr-1540. 
 201. See, e.g., Law of War Detention and the President’s Executive Order Establishing 
Periodic Review Boards for Guantanamo Detainees:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Armed Servs., 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, 
Chairman, Comm. on Armed Servs.) (stating that he had “significant concerns about the 
review process established pursuant to the President’s Executive Order” providing amended 
periodic review processes to Guantánamo detainees). 
 202. Johan Steyn, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, Guantanamo Bay:  The Legal Black Hole 
(Nov. 25, 2003). 
 203. See, e.g., Eur. Comm. for Democracy Through Law, Venice Comm., Opinion on the 
International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret 
Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, 66th Plenary Sess., Op. No. 
363/2005 (2006); Eur. Parl. Ass., Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Transfers 
Involving Europe Member States, Doc. No. 16 (2006). 
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state secrets doctrine.204  Finally, on several issues on which European 
states have been most vocal, little has changed since 2001.  The United 
States has not committed to stop using renditions, ceased to use an armed 
conflict paradigm as a basis for its struggle against al Qaeda, or foregone 
the use of security detentions.  In short, pressure from U.S. allies may have 
an atmospheric effect, and it may influence the views of the American elite, 
but there is little evidence to suggest that U.S. allies have had a significant 
effect on most U.S. national security policies. 
3.  Public Attitudes 
It is worth considering whether the executive undertook the policy 
changes discussed herein as a result of an overall shift in public attitudes 
toward those policies.  After all, the president must answer to the American 
public, at least at the polls.  Yet two factors suggest that general public 
opinion was not a notable source of pressure to alter these national security 
policies.  First, at least some of the policies discussed in Part I almost 
certainly were unknown to most of the American public—including DOJ 
policies about the use of secret evidence in immigration proceedings, and 
the detention review policies in Afghanistan.  Second, even for those 
national security policies that receive extensive coverage in the media, there 
is good reason to think that pressure from the general public cannot account 
for policy shifts in a rights-protective direction.  The American public tends 
to favor aggressive security policies.  For example, in a recent Pew survey 
on drone use, 56 percent of those surveyed approved the United States’s use 
of drones to target extremists in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, with 18 
percent unsure and only 26 percent disapproving.205  In a survey from 2010, 
nearly half of those surveyed thought that the government’s antiterrorism 
policies had not gone far enough to protect the country, while slightly less 
than one-third of survey respondents thought those policies had gone too far 
in restricting civil liberties.206  While these surveys do not specifically 
address the policies considered here, one could extrapolate from these 
results to conclude that a healthy majority of Americans would favor robust 
national security policies, especially when those policies are directed at 
non-U.S. nationals. 
In contrast, elite public opinion likely has a much stronger effect on 
executive policymaking.  As discussed above, elite views may affect court 
decisions, and thus we should expect the observer effect to become stronger 
in situations in which the media and other elites are focused on a particular 
 
 204. See Frost, supra note 89, at 1933 (describing state secrets privilege as implicating 
U.S. separation-of-powers concerns because of the potential to leave the executive 
unchecked by the other branches). 
 205. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR U.S. 
DRONE STRIKES 1 (2013). 
 206. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, CONTINUED POSITIVE MARKS FOR 
GOVERNMENT ANTI-TERROR EFFORTS 2 (2010); see also Mark Landler & Dalia Sussman, 
Poll Finds Strong Acceptance for Public Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2013, at A16 
(stating that 78 percent of Americans favor surveillance cameras in public places). 
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policy.207  But those views also surely impact executive decisionmaking 
directly, and elite views slant to the left today.208  Executive officials may 
be sensitive to elite opinion for the same reasons that Supreme Court 
justices are:  people want to be liked and respected by those to whom they 
are close and with those whom they identify.209  For many senior and 
midlevel executive officials, this includes political elites, journalists, and 
academics.  Executive officials may be affected by reputational concerns 
here:  when the media shines a spotlight on a policy that—seen in the harsh 
light of day—appears to have struck an overly security-driven balance, that 
exposure provides an additional impetus to alter the policy.210 
This Article does not and cannot rule out an important role for elite views 
in prompting the executive to modify its policies, particularly once they 
come to light as a result of litigation.  But the existence of this influence 
does not erase the important pressures brought to bear by an increased 
awareness of possible court intervention, especially because courts have the 
power specifically to rewrite national security policies in a way that 
members of the public do not. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY DEFERENCE 
In the post–September 11 world, the U.S. government has been involved 
in an unprecedented amount of national security litigation, in which 
plaintiffs have contested many executive policies.  Part I identified a subset 
of this litigation.  This national security litigation has involved individuals 
who have:  challenged detention policies and individual detention 
determinations within the United States, at Guantánamo, and in 
Afghanistan;211 sought to block their transfers from U.S. military custody to 
the custody of various foreign governments;212 claimed damages resulting 
from alleged U.S. renditions and mistreatment of detainees;213 demanded 
information about how the government decides to place individuals on the 
 
 207. See supra text accompanying note 158. 
 208. Baum & Devins, supra note 158, at 1545 & n.156 (discussing political orientations 
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 209. Id. at 1537. See generally David G. Winter, Measuring the Motives of Political 
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U.S. “no-fly list”;214 asserted that military commissions in general and 
specific commission prosecutions in particular are legally flawed;215 and 
attempted to block alleged targeting decisions.216  As a result, scholars 
recently have devoted significant attention to the relationship between the 
executive and the judiciary in the area of national security.  A key focus of 
this work has been on the proper role for courts in reviewing executive 
decisions.  The work parses empirical questions (i.e., to what extent have 
courts deferred to executive legal and factual assertions?) and normative 
questions (i.e., to what extent should courts defer in this area?). 
This Part summarizes the empirical and normative debates and concludes 
that they have reached a stalemate.  Scholars disagree empirically about the 
extent to which courts defer to executive positions in foreign affairs and 
national security cases, though the dominant view is that courts frequently 
defer.  They also disagree normatively about when courts should defer.  
This Part then illustrates that the observer effect is a relevant phenomenon 
that has been absent from these discussions.  In the national security area, 
the effect made itself especially apparent between 2004 and 2009, as courts 
began to challenge the historical breadth of deference that the executive 
received.217  Factoring the observer effect into the deference equation 
produces two unexpected insights.  First, by virtue of the observer effect, 
occasional judicial decisions not to defer to the executive branch have a 
greater impact on policy than is generally recognized, even in an area of law 
where many perceive the executive to have a free hand.  Second, because 
the observer effect exerts a restraining influence ex ante on executive 
decisions about where to draw policy lines, court decisions to defer often 
reflect (and require) a more modest degree of deference to executive 
judgment than is commonly realized. 
A.  Terminology 
Before introducing the debates, it is important to clarify what this Article 
means by “deference.”  Deference occurs when a decision maker follows a 
determination made by another entity to reach a decision different than that 
which the decision maker might have reached if deciding the question 
independently.218  This definition of “deference” is relevant to situations in 
 
 214. Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 215. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (challenging military commission jurisdiction over charges of conspiracy, 
solicitation, and material support for terrorism). 
 216. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 217. The observer effect is cyclical.  We now appear to be in a period in which the courts 
have resumed a highly deferential posture toward the executive, in part because the robust 
observer effect in the 2004–2009 period prompted notable shifts in executive policies. See 
supra text accompanying note 36. 
 218. Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1073 
(2008); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (1983) (treating deference as displacing the interpretation that a court would have 
reached otherwise); cf. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1987) (“A 
naked argument from precedent thus urges that a decisionmaker give weight to a particular 
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which a court hears a national security case on the merits and substitutes the 
executive’s determination (in whole or in part) for its own.  But this Article 
embraces a broader idea of deference as well, one that includes situations in 
which courts use abstention-like doctrines to decline to hear such cases on 
their merits.  The use of the political question doctrine, for instance, is a 
form of judicial deference to executive positions.219  Other manifestations 
of deference include denials of certiorari by the Supreme Court,220 the use 
of standing and ripeness doctrines to decline to hear claims challenging the 
introduction of U.S. troops into hostilities abroad,221 and the dismissal of a 
case based on the government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege.222 
Deference is not binary.  This Article also considers the relevance of the 
“degree” of deference, which describes the extent to which the 
decisionmaker will defer:  Will it defer absolutely?223  Substantially but not 
entirely?224  In assessing the degree of deference given by a decisionmaker, 
one must ask about the nature of the claim for which the party at issue seeks 
deference.  The more aggressively an executive policy seeks to interfere 
with individual rights, the greater the degree of deference a court would 
need to give to uphold that policy.225 
The executive seeks judicial deference for different types of decisions or 
assertions.  At least five types of deference may arise in the foreign affairs 
context.226  Although foreign affairs deference cases do not overlap entirely 
 
result regardless of whether that decisionmaker believes it to be correct and regardless of 
whether that decisionmaker believes it valuable in any way to rely on that previous result.”). 
 219. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 192, at 659–60 (treating the political question doctrine 
as equivalent to absolute deference).  Judge Bates’s decision in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010), in which the court declined to adjudicate the legality of an alleged 
U.S. decision to target an American citizen in Yemen based on standing problems and the 
political question doctrine, stands as a good example of a decision this Article treats as 
“deferential.” 
 220. It also includes grants of certiorari that limit the question presented.  For example, 
the Court granted certiorari in Rasul v. Bush, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003), on only one of the 
questions presented in the certiorari petition.  Jenny Martinez interprets this, reasonably, as a 
signal that the Court was not anxious to reach the merits of the case, including questions 
about whether Guantánamo detainees had constitutional rights.  Martinez, supra note 3, at 
1050. 
 221. See, e.g., Doe I v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003) (dismissing, on ripeness 
grounds, a suit by military personnel and members of Congress claiming that an invasion of 
Iraq would be unconstitutional); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(granting motion to dismiss Representative Dennis Kucinich’s claim that the president 
exceeded his constitutional authority to launch military operations in Libya without 
congressional authorization). 
 222. See supra notes 92–103 and accompanying text. 
 223. Horwitz, supra note 218, at 1073.  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court assumed that it 
owed “complete deference” to the president’s determination that it was impractical to apply 
civilian criminal trial rules to Hamdan’s military commission. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. at 623. 
 224. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 556–57 (E.D. Va. 2002) (granting 
“substantial or great weight” to the executive’s interpretation and application of the Geneva 
Conventions, but rejecting “[c]onclusive deference, which amounts to judicial abstention”). 
 225. This assumes that the policy does not fall squarely within established constitutional 
doctrine or plain statutory language. 
 226. Bradley, supra note 192, at 659–64. 
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with national security deference cases, many forms of deference in the 
foreign affairs taxonomy appear in national security cases as well.  The 
most robust form of deference is “political question” deference, which 
equates to absolute judicial deference to the political branches.  Other forms 
of deference include:  deference to the executive’s assessment of 
“international facts”; “persuasiveness” deference based on the executive’s 
role as a knowledgeable representative of U.S. interests; and Chevron 
deference, where courts defer to reasonable executive interpretations of 
treaties and foreign affairs statutes.227  The cases considered in Part I 
include each of these types of executive deference claims. 
Because deference implicates core constitutional values, it is easy to 
understand why scholars and judges extensively debate its applications, 
virtues, and vices.  The following sections discuss two ongoing debates 
about national security deference, one empirical and one normative. 
B.  The Empirical Debate 
The question seems simple:  to what extent do courts actually defer to 
challenged executive policies in the national security area?  The answer, 
however, is not.  It implicates complicated determinations about which 
cases constitute “national security” cases, questions about how to measure a 
“win” or “loss” for the government, an examination of whether deference 
manifests itself more strongly in particular categories of cases, and 
decisions of what the types of assertions (factual or legal) are for which the 
government seeks deference. 
The Supreme Court’s language in several high-profile cases offers fodder 
for the conclusion that courts defer extensively to the executive when U.S. 
national security or foreign affairs interests are at stake.  In United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Court cited the president’s “very delicate, 
plenary and exclusive power . . . as the sole organ of the federal government 
in the field of international relations” and recognized that the president 
required “a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction” 
when international affairs are at issue.228  The Court stated in Department 
of the Navy v. Egan that “unless Congress specifically has provided 
otherwise, courts traditionally [should be] . . . reluctant to intrude upon the 
authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.”229  
Most recently, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project gave strong deference 
 
 227. Id. at 661–63; see also Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 
VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009) (offering examples of cases in which the government seeks 
deference for its factual assessments in national security contexts).  The executive also 
(unsuccessfully) has sought deference to its constitutional judgments in some cases, 
including Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 228. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
 229. Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988).  Other prominent pro-deference 
cases include Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 
(1948) (asserting that executive decisions about foreign policy “belong in the domain of 
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry”), and Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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to executive factfinding in a case that implicated “sensitive and weighty 
interests of national security and foreign affairs.”230 
Yet other high-profile cases offer a different view of the Court’s role in 
times of emergency.  Many cite Ex parte Milligan as a paradigmatic case in 
which the Court staked out a distinctly nondeferential role for itself:  “[I]f 
society is disturbed by civil commotion . . . these safeguards [of liberty] 
need, and should receive, the watchful care of those intrusted with the 
guardianship of the Constitution and laws.”231  Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer famously rejected President Harry Truman’s effort during the 
Korean War to seize control of the steel industry, notwithstanding executive 
claims that the seizure was necessary “to avert a national catastrophe.”232  
And since September 11, 2001, scholars point to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,233 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,234 and Boumediene v. Bush235 as examples of 
nondeferential decisions in this area. 
Much of the empirical scholarship that synthesizes national security cases 
adheres to a “crisis thesis,” a claim that the Supreme Court consistently has 
proven willing to suppress rights and liberties when the United States is 
under threat.236  At least some scholarship in this camp, based on a small 
sample of high-profile cases or on conventional understandings, claims that 
courts pervasively demonstrate deference.237  Other writers believe that 
 
 230. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (“One reason for 
that respect is that national security and foreign policy concerns arise in connection with 
efforts to confront evolving threats in an area where information can be difficult to obtain 
and the impact of certain conduct difficult to assess.”); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. 
Supp. 2d 250, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he task of balancing individual rights against 
national-security concerns is one that courts should not undertake without the guidance or 
the authority of the coordinate branches, in whom the Constitution imposes responsibility for 
our foreign affairs and national security.”). 
 231. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123–24 (1866). 
 232. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582. 
 233. 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (rejecting the executive’s claim that Hamdi’s detention 
should be free of judicial oversight and stating, “Whatever power the United States 
Constitution envisions for the executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy 
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches 
when individual liberties are at stake”). 
 234. 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (rejecting executive interpretation of the 2006 Military 
Commissions Act). 
 235. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 236. Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis:  How War Affects Only Non-
war Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2005) (describing the “crisis thesis”). 
 237. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 151, at 16 (“Conventional wisdom among 
constitutional lawyers . . . holds that courts defer heavily to government in times of 
emergency, either by upholding government’s action on the merits, or by ducking hard cases 
that might require ruling against the government.”); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 
53 (“At the level of constitutional law, the overall record is that courts tend to defer heavily 
to the executive in times of crisis, only reasserting themselves once the public sense of 
imminent threat has passed.”); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere:  Rights, National 
Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 
702 (2004) (“[I]n both the international and the domestic spheres, courts have generally been 
reluctant to declare conduct to be unlawful when there is any plausible claim of military or 
national security necessity.”); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:  Checking 
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2321 (2006) (“[T]he 
executive branch has gained power from deference doctrines that induce courts to leave 
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foreign affairs deference ebbs and flows in different historical periods.238  
Yet others see a shift away from deference to the executive since September 
11.239  A prominent fourth camp asserts that courts are most likely to defer 
in the national security context to actions taken jointly by Congress and the 
executive, and are least likely to defer to executive assertions of inherent, 
unilateral power.240 
Several scholars, dissatisfied with the current, fragmented understandings 
of national security deference, have undertaken extensive empirical studies 
to measure the deference that courts grant the executive’s national security 
decisions.  The most extensive of these studies concludes that Supreme 
Court justices are significantly more likely to curtail rights and liberties 
during times of war and crisis.241  Notably, though, the study finds that the 
existence of war does not affect the subset of cases related directly to the 
war.242  This suggests that claims about extensive deference by courts (or at 
least the Supreme Court) on national security issues during wartime may be 
somewhat overstated. 
This conclusion stands in some tension with other studies.  William 
Eskridge and Lauren Baer examined more than 1,000 cases in which the 
Supreme Court reviewed an agency’s statutory interpretation.243  They 
 
much conduct untouched—particularly in foreign affairs.”).  Others conclude, either 
generally or in specific cases, that courts give the executive limited deference. See Martin S. 
Flaherty, Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After 9/11, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119, 130 
(2011) (claiming that the Supreme Court’s deference doctrine “appears as little more than a 
passing reference to conclusions that have already been reached” on the basis of other 
interpretive techniques); Pearlstein, supra note 192, at 1064–65 (asserting that the Court in 
Hamdi and Hamdan showed no deference to the executive’s arguments); Roach, supra note 
112, at 140 (arguing that courts in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have 
been surprisingly active in reviewing their executives’ national security actions).  Aziz Huq 
argues that courts give the executive no greater or lesser deference in national security cases 
than they do in other types of cases. Huq, supra note 3, at 226 (arguing that there is nothing 
unique about the ways courts respond to national security situations). 
 238. David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations:  A 
Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 497–99 (2007) (noting that the 
Court gave the executive no deference in treaty interpretation in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, extensive deference in the Rehnquist Court, and more limited deference 
in Hamdan); cf. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA 
L. REV. 953, 1016 (1994) (viewing deference to executive treaty interpretations as near-
absolute, no matter what the justices claim); Chesney, supra note 192, at 1732 (noting 
courts’ “considerable confusion with respect to the obligation to give at least some deference 
to executive treaty interpretations”). 
 239. Pearlstein, supra note 130, at 785; see also KOH, supra note 41, at 148 (arguing that 
the trend in the 1980s toward executive insulation from judicial review in foreign affairs was 
a relatively recent development); Scheppele, supra note 3, at 94 (arguing that the “face of 
judicial deference has radically changed” since September 11). 
 240. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 3; Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1703–06 (2011). 
 241. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME SILENCE DURING WAR 71 (2003) (“[W]e found no 
effect of war on cases to which the [U.S.] government is an express party.”); see also 
Epstein, supra note 236. 
 242. Epstein, supra note 236, at 9. 
 243. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1083, 1094 (2008). 
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found that the executive branch wins 78.5 percent of the time when the 
statutory framework at issue implicates foreign affairs or national security, 
and wins 100 percent of the time when the Court specifically invokes 
Curtiss-Wright deference.244  To be sure, Eskridge and Baer review cases 
without regard to whether they arose during wartime and focus only on 
cases of statutory interpretation.  Their conclusion is supported by a study 
by Cass Sunstein, who examined national security–related decisions in the 
courts of appeals between September 11, 2001, and September 10, 2008.245  
He found that these courts invalidated executive policies only 15 percent of 
the time, a rate lower than almost all other areas of law.246  Sunstein 
assesses that appellate courts have shown a high rate of deference to the 
executive in national security cases, but have stopped short of adopting an 
irrebuttable presumption in favor of the government.247 
Taken together, these studies do not allow us to say with certainty what 
levels of deference courts apply to executive national security policies.  And 
while efforts to study what courts actually do in this area clearly are useful, 
these measurements have not attempted to detect relationships between 
particular clusters of national security cases, or to analyze the degree of 
deference that executive branch seeks in any particular case, something that 
would require an assessment of how aggressive a particular national 
security policy is.  These omissions create an important gap in 
understanding national security deference. 
C.  The Normative Debate 
If the empirical deference debate produces a divide among scholars, the 
normative debate reveals an even greater multitude of views, among both 
scholars and judges.  At its core, the normative debate implicates key 
separation of powers questions:  How squarely do national security issues 
fall exclusively to the executive as a matter of constitutional text?  To what 
extent is judicial review necessary to check curtailments of individual rights 
specifically and undue accretions of power by the executive more 
generally?  And how should the functional competencies of each branch—
derived in part from their respective constitutionally created structures—
affect our views on the propriety of national security deference? 
This section discusses the views of scholars, courts, and the executive 
branch, and describes the constitutional norms underlying each position.  
There is a vast literature on separation of powers issues, including in the 
national security context, and there is rough consensus on the underlying 
goals of separating the powers of government.248  For the purposes of this 
 
 244. Id. at 1098 (describing agency interpretations involving foreign affairs and national 
security as receiving “super-deference”). 
 245. Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 269, 
270. 
 246. Id. at 276–77. 
 247. Id. at 281–82. 
 248. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000) 
(describing goals as protecting fundamental rights, advancing democracy, and enhancing 
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Article, I rely on the following trinity of goals:  protecting individual 
liberty, preserving democratic accountability, and promoting effectiveness 
by allowing branches to develop different specializations and 
competencies.249  Deference proponents generally focus on effectiveness 
and democratic accountability.  Deference skeptics focus on protecting 
individual liberty and on broader institutional concerns about the inter-
branch balance of power. 
1.  Deference Proponents 
On one end of the spectrum are those who believe that judicial 
involvement in national security issues damages U.S. security and should 
be minimized.  Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for instance, see courts as 
more likely than the political branches to strike the wrong balance between 
liberty and security.  They therefore argue that “judicial review of the 
security-liberty tradeoffs that government makes during emergencies is 
affirmatively harmful.”250  This view seems consistent with Justice 
Clarence Thomas’s highly deferential approach to executive decisions that 
implicate military or foreign affairs.251 
Others take a more modest approach.  Cass Sunstein would retain some 
role for the courts on national security issues, albeit a deferential one.  He 
argues that courts should give the president Chevron deference for “all 
exercises of presidential power when Congress has authorized the President 
to protect the nation’s security.”252 Sunstein urges courts to apply such 
deference even when the executive interprets statutes that do not expressly 
delegate decisionmaking to the president.253  Writing with Eric Posner, 
 
professional competence); Rebecca Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516, 1531 (1991) (arguing that the primary separation of powers goal is 
to protect individual rights against encroachment by a tyrannical majority); Flaherty, supra 
note 38, at 1729–30 (describing separation-of-powers goals as balance, accountability, and 
government energy); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers 
Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1148 n.80 (2000) (arguing that formalists and functionalists agree 
on an intermediate goal of separation of powers:  to prevent a single branch of government 
from possessing and using too much power). 
 249. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 
41 CONN. L. REV. 1549 (2009). 
 250. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 151, at 20 (denying that executive decisionmaking 
during emergencies reflects panic and that judges as an institutional matter can improve on 
such decisionmaking); see also Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld:  The 
Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 179, 180 (2006) (claiming that the Hamdan Court’s refusal to defer to the 
executive will raise transaction costs for policymakers without serious benefits). 
 251. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 678–80 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 
plurality’s evident belief that it is qualified to pass on the ‘military necessity’ of the 
Commander in Chief’s decision to employ a particular form of force against our enemies is 
so antithetical to our constitutional structure that it simply cannot go unanswered. . . .  [T]he 
President’s decision to try Hamdan before a military commission for his involvement with al 
Qaeda is entitled to a heavy measure of deference.” (citations omitted)). 
 252. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2664 
(2005). 
 253. Id. at 2671 (“Insofar as the AUMF is applied in a context that involves the 
constitutional powers of the President, it should be interpreted generously.  In this domain, 
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Sunstein then goes further, arguing that where there is “no interpretation of 
a statutory term but simply a policy judgment by the executive, the courts 
should defer as well, using Chevron as an analogy.”254  In sum, courts 
should give Chevron deference to all executive national security 
policymaking decisions, whether or not the executive develops those 
policies pursuant to statutory authorization.  Joseph Landau takes a more 
constrained approach to deference, arguing that courts should “scale” 
Chevron deference by giving the executive greater deference when it 
operates pursuant to a delegation from Congress and less deference when 
the executive acts pursuant to its own authority only.255 
Unsurprisingly, the executive branch tends to seek deference 
aggressively in national security cases, based in part on claims about its 
superior effectiveness in making national security decisions.256  In its brief 
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, for example, the government argued: 
As this Court has observed, “courts traditionally have been reluctant to 
intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national 
security affairs.”  The customary deference that courts afford the 
Executive in matters of military affairs is especially warranted in this 
context. 
 A commander’s wartime determination that an individual is an enemy 
combatant is a quintessentially military judgment, representing a core 
exercise of the Commander-in-Chief authority . . . .  Especially in the 
course of hostilities, the military through its operations and intelligence-
gathering has an unmatched vantage point from which to learn about the 
enemy and make judgments as to whether those seized during a conflict 
are friend or foe.257 
 
the President receives the kind of super-strong deference that derives from the combination 
of Chevron with what are plausibly taken to be his constitutional responsibilities.”); see also 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2084 n.150 (2005) (“Executive Branch interpretations 
of the AUMF might be entitled to deference under, or by analogy to, the Chevron doctrine in 
administrative law. . . .  Such interpretive deference may be particularly appropriate in the 
context of the AUMF because it is a statute regulating foreign affairs.”). 
 254. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 193, at 1198–99. 
 255. Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets Youngstown:  National Security and the 
Administrative State, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1917, 1976–77 (2012). 
 256. The Bush Administration also made “formalist” separation-of-power claims to the 
effect that particular military and national security decisions were constitutionally allocated 
to the executive and could not be infringed by either of the other branches. See, e.g., 
Respondents’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismiss or for Judgment As a 
Matter of Law at 10, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, No. 1:04-cv-01166-RJL (D.D.C. 
Nov. 16, 2004), 2004 WL 5225831 (“[U]nder our constitutional system, decisions about how 
to provide for the national defense and whether to recognize a state of war and/or employ 
military force abroad are placed singularly in the Executive Branch. . . .  For this Court to 
proclaim . . . that the President’s prosecution of a war against al Qaeda and its co-
belligerents is nothing more than a ‘rhetorical declaration’ would present a separation of 
powers problem of the most dire sort.”). 
 257. Brief for the Respondents at 25–26, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 
03-6696), 2004 WL 724020, at *25–26 (citations omitted); Brief for the Respondents, supra, 
at 46 (arguing that an additional court-imposed process would be “constitutionally 
intolerable”). 
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The government’s language in this brief is typical of the positions that Bush 
Administration lawyers took in other litigation, and is not dramatically 
different from positions taken by other administrations.258 
Those who support deference to executive authority in the national 
security context primarily invoke two separation of powers values:  
effectiveness and democratic accountability.259  Some deference proponents 
focus on the affirmative competence of the executive to make national 
security decisions.  These proponents claim that:  (1) the executive must 
remain unfettered when protecting the country against dire threats,260 (2) 
the executive has unparalleled policy expertise,261 and (3) the executive 
holds a unique ability to act with speed and secrecy.262  Other arguments 
focus, inversely, on the judiciary’s lack of institutional competence in this 
area—particularly on claims that the judiciary lacks access to the 
information it needs to evaluate the import of the facts at issue and that it is 
ill suited to assess the consequences of its judgments.263  In both cases, 
 
 258. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
227, 239 n.33 (2006); see, e.g., United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 555 (E.D. Va. 
2002) (noting government contention that “the President’s determination that Taliban 
members are unlawful combatants was made pursuant to his constitutional Commander-in-
Chief and foreign affairs powers and is therefore not subject to judicial review or second 
guessing because it involves a quintessentially nonjusticiable political question”); Brief for 
the Petitioner at 20–21, Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (No. 86-1552), 1987 
WL 880362, at *20–21 (“National security matters, as this Court has recognized, are ‘the 
province and responsibility of the executive.  As to these areas of Art. II duties the courts 
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities.’” (citations 
omitted)); Supplemental Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 10–11, Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 
Nos. 06-5209, 06-5222 (2009), 2009 WL 700175 (opposing a Bivens action against U.S. 
military officials for actions taken toward aliens detained during wartime because it “would 
enmesh the courts in military, national security, and foreign affairs matters that are the 
exclusive province of the political branches”). 
 259. See supra text accompanying note 249. 
 260. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 151, at 16 (“Constitutional rights should be relaxed 
so that the executive can move forcefully against the threat.”). 
 261. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 193, at 1176; Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial 
Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1263, 1301 (2002) (“On delicate matters of 
international diplomacy and national defense, the structural advantages and resultant 
expertise of the executive may support substantial deference on treaty interpretation 
matters.”). 
 262. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(stating that during times of war, “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” are at a 
premium); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 151, at 16 (“The real cause of deference to 
government in times of emergency is institutional:  both Congress and the judiciary defer to 
the executive during emergencies because of the executive’s institutional advantages in 
speed, secrecy, and decisiveness.”); id. at 17 (normatively supporting “high deference”); 
John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 821 (2004) 
(describing the executive’s ability to act with secrecy and expedition).  Attorney General 
Holder recently argued, “The conduct and management of national security operations are 
core functions of the Executive Branch, as courts have recognized throughout our history. 
 Military and civilian officials must often make real-time decisions that balance the need to 
act, the existence of alternative options, the possibility of collateral damage, and other 
judgments—all of which depend on expertise and immediate access to information that only 
the Executive Branch may possess in real time.” Holder, supra note 184. 
 263. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (finding that 
the president “has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign 
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deference proponents conclude that the executive has an “efficiency” 
advantage over courts in crafting workable security policies. 
The other argument in favor of deference involves political 
accountability.  It is relatively clear that the executive bears greater political 
accountability than courts do.264 That political accountability serves as an 
important check on executive decisionmaking, whereby the electorate can 
punish or reward the executive for making various policy decisions.  Some 
in this camp presumably would favor deference to the executive only when 
it acts pursuant to legislatively delegated authority, because political 
accountability is at its height.265  Others rest on the fact that the executive is 
more politically accountable than the courts, regardless of whether 
executive action is buttressed by a statutory delegation. 
In the views of the U.S. government and these scholars (and often of 
courts themselves), the political branches are in a better position to balance 
liberty and security than the courts, and the executive’s structural attributes 
in particular render it best suited to make critical national security decisions. 
2.  Deference Skeptics 
At the other end of the spectrum are those who deem it imperative that 
courts play a role in evaluating national security decisions by the executive 
(and Congress).266  The core separation of powers goal of protecting 
individual rights frequently undergirds this normative skepticism about 
judicial deference.  A related, more systemic institutional concern also 
appears:  the basic need to preserve a balance of power among the three 
branches.267  The Madisonian notion of separation of powers presumes that 
 
countries, and especially is this true in time of war”); Stillman v. CIA, 319 F.3d 546, 548 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is often difficult for a court to review the classification of national 
security information.”); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 151, at 129 (“The judges lack the 
information needed to evaluate [the] government’s claims, and know that they lack it.”); 
Daniel Solove, The Darkest Domain:  Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 
IOWA L. REV. 941, 1006 (1999) (“[T]he Court often contrasts the expertise of the officials 
under review to its own generalist and uninformed nature.”); Sunstein, supra note 152, at 53 
(“[C]ourts have institutional weaknesses of their own.  Worst of all, they lack relevant 
information and hence they may not know whether an interference with liberty is actually 
justified.”). 
 264. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 582–83 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that military and foreign policy judgments “‘are and should be undertaken only by those 
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.  They are decisions 
of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which 
has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion 
or inquiry.’” (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 
(1948))); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 52–54. 
 265. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 3; Landau, supra note 3. 
 266. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 151, at 1334 (“[T]here are strong reasons not to defer to 
executive power, especially in emergencies.”); Flaherty, supra note 237, at 164 (arguing that 
courts should give no deference to the executive’s interpretations of the Constitution, 
treaties, or statutes, particularly in the area of foreign relations). 
 267. See Flaherty, supra note 38, at 1730, 1741 (“Most often opposing accountability and 
energy is balance among the branches, especially balance designed to prevent tyrannical 
accretions of power.”).  The protection of individual rights and the importance of interbranch 
balance are directly related.  The reason to divide roles among different branches of 
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each branch of government will seek to jealously guard its powers, ensuring 
that no particular branch accrues too much power to itself.  Founders such 
as John Jay and Alexander Hamilton believed that the judiciary should be a 
full player in the separation of powers framework, including in foreign 
relations.268  Sunstein describes the motivations behind this approach: 
In “perilous times,” it might be thought, [the political] branches are 
especially prone to a serious form of lawlessness . . . and it becomes all 
the more important for courts to insist on compliance with the rule of law.  
On this view, the system of checks and balances, including an 
independent judiciary, is no less dispensable when the stakes are high and 
damaging intrusions on liberty are likely.269 
In various post–September 11 cases, several justices have laid out 
arguments against strong deference to the executive.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor focused on a rights-protecting separation of 
powers rationale when she wrote: 
[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of 
powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in 
such circumstances. . . .  Whatever power the United States Constitution 
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with 
enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a 
role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.270 
Boumediene is more explicitly focused on the goal of balance among the 
branches, though embedded in that concern is an awareness that habeas 
corpus implicates individual rights.  Justice Kennedy noted that the 
government’s “formal sovereignty-based test” for when judicial review may 
extend to non-U.S. territory “raises troubling separation-of-powers concerns 
. . . [that] have particular bearing on the Suspension Clause question in the 
cases now before us, for the writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable 
mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers.”271  Several Supreme 
Court opinions thus recently have deemed it important for courts to evaluate 
executive national security policies, both to prevent the executive from 
accreting too much power to itself, and to ensure that executive policies do 
not infringe unlawfully on individual rights. 
Finally, a few scholars have argued that the pro-deference camp is 
insufficiently skeptical about the institutional efficiency claims.  Deborah 
Pearlstein, for example, rejects the idea that the unitary executive is the 
 
government is to limit the power of any one branch of government and, in so doing, protect 
individual liberties against governmental overreach. 
 268. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); id. NO. 80, 
at 476–77 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) 
Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:  Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1311 
(1988) (describing “Youngstown’s vision of institutional and constitutional balance”). 
 269. Sunstein, supra note 245, at 269–70; see also Pearlstein, supra note 249, at 1573 (“It 
should be . . . beyond question that a core goal of dividing roles among different branches is 
to limit power and thereby to protect individual liberty.”). 
 270. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–36 (2004). 
 271. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764–65 (2008). 
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ideal structure through which to make national security decisions.272  
Indeed, she believes that the functional advantages usually attributed to the 
executive are overstated,273 and insists that any deference given by a court 
to executive positions must limit “excessive delegations of power and 
disfavor interpretations that disable any one branch from continued 
participation in a deliberative dialogue.”274 
Like the empirical debate, the normative debate continues without 
resolution.  While this Article does not purport to put these difficult issues 
to bed, it aims to shed light on both debates by prompting a reconsideration 
of the judicial-executive dynamics in this arena. 
D.  Advancing Separation of Powers Values 
Both of these debates—about how extensively courts do defer to the 
executive on national security issues and about how much they should 
defer—fail to take into account an important dynamic that should inform 
our views about national security deference:  the observer effect.  
Understanding the way the observer effect operates should lower the 
temperature of the debate.  The observer effect ultimately advances all three 
core separation-of-powers values just discussed:  protecting individual 
liberty (and sustaining a more systemic balance of power), preserving 
democratic accountability, and promoting efficiency and effectiveness.  
This is not to argue that the observer effect allows accountability and 
effectiveness goals to manifest themselves as vigorously as complete 
judicial deference would.  Nor is it to argue that reliance on the observer 
effect advances the protection of individual rights as robustly as a total 
absence of judicial deference would.  It is to suggest, however, that the 
observer effect potentially promotes all three values at once in a way that 
the alternatives do not. 
As a result, the current normative deference debate—which either favors 
the executive’s functional advantages by allowing the executive broad 
discretion to navigate national security issues, or urges judicial involvement 
to protect individual rights and preserve structural balance—needlessly 
frames the discussion as an either/or proposition.  Instead, ample judicial 
deference to executive security policies—interspersed with occasional non-
deferential decisions—can promote both sets of values simultaneously. 
 
 272. Pearlstein, supra note 249, at 1598; see also Peter M. Shane, Executive Branch Self-
Policing in Times of Crisis:  The Challenges for Conscientious Legal Analysis, 5 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 507, 508 (2012) (“Part of the impetus toward concentrating power in 
the executive branch is the belief, which I consider false, that the President is better able and 
more likely to operate in the ‘national interest’ under presidentialist, rather than pluralist 
arrangements.”). 
 273. Pearlstein, supra note 249, at 1582 n.119 (citing Hamdi’s assertion that it is 
“unlikely that this basic [review] process will have the dire impact on the central functions of 
warmaking that the Government forecasts”); see also Cole, supra note 151, at 1357 (“It is 
not clear that any branch of government has more or less expertise dealing with emergencies; 
they simply have different roles to play in those emergencies.”). 
 274. Pearlstein, supra note 130, at 791. 
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1.  Effectiveness 
Hamilton famously remarked that housing powers in a unitary executive 
provides the advantages of “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.”275  
Executive unilateralists have pointed to the particular salience of these 
characteristics when the United States is faced with an imminent or actual 
threat to its own national security.276  Assuming that the executive (by 
virtue of its expertise, access to classified information, and ability to act 
expeditiously in response to real-world events) tends to be better suited than 
courts to make difficult legal policy judgments, the observer effect allows 
the executive to retain control over the bulk of those judgments.  It often 
results in executive control over policy corrections as well, even as the 
possibility of court review prompts the executive to make those corrections.  
The effect, when functioning well, helps the executive avoid most direct 
court intercessions by focusing the executive’s attention more keenly on 
those equities the courts would evaluate if forced to review those policies.  
If one believes, as many do, that the executive branch holds particular 
advantages in responding to questions that implicate national security and 
the conduct of military or intelligence operations, this is a positive result. 
Those who adopt strong executive unilateralist positions will not be fully 
satisfied by the observer effect phenomenon because, in order for the effect 
to operate, the judiciary must retain some role in evaluating the legality of 
the executive’s national security policies.  Courts may do so on the merits, 
or they may choose to do so more indirectly, through dialogue and 
signaling.  Either way, courts retain a hand in developing national security 
policies by serving as a specter in the executive conference rooms in which 
policies are made.  At the same time, the fact that the observer effect 
moderates executive policies means that the courts often are able to avoid 
wading into areas that fall outside their core spheres of competence.  The 
executive branch continues to shape the details—the procedures, scope, and 
substance—of national security policy, but the observer effect ensures that 
the executive does not govern “nearly alone.”277 
Some commentators may view as unseemly the courts’ role in fostering 
the observer effect.  On this view, the observer effect allows courts to 
interfere with national security policies without having to decide hard issues 
publicly and, in so doing, to avoid having to put their reputations on the 
line.  This concern is not without merit, particularly if one believes that 
courts are adequately positioned as a structural matter to assess national 
security issues.  In contrast, if one believes that the executive bears 
significant structural advantages over courts in this area, one is likely to 
view the courts’ light touch as a satisfactory way to navigate this shoal. 
 
 275. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick, ed., 1987). 
 276. See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 151, at 55 (“[D]uring emergencies, the 
public will often favor increased executive power, and this may be fully sensible, given the 
executive’s relative decisiveness, secrecy, centralization, and other advantages over 
Congress and other institutions.”). 
 277. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 4–5. 
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2.  Individual Rights Protection and Interbranch Balancing 
Those courts and scholars who tend to be skeptical about the propriety of 
extensive national security deference worry most about the effect that 
deference has on individual rights.  The Supreme Court itself articulated 
this concern in Hamdi, rejecting the executive’s argument that the courts 
have only a “circumscribed role” to play in evaluating the review processes 
to which a detained enemy combatant was entitled.278  In times of 
emergency, the executive often has undue incentives to focus on security 
equities and reduced incentives to weigh individual rights properly against 
those equities.  Courts, in contrast, are thought to have the independence to 
defend the rights of minorities.279  If courts defer in these cases, those rights 
will go unprotected against government power. 
The observer effect offers some—though not perfect—protection against 
this concern.  For the observer effect to operate, courts periodically must 
assume jurisdiction over national security cases.  Given the breadth of 
deference “tools” the judiciary has, it has significant flexibility to determine 
the cases in which it wishes to intervene.  There are competing stories to be 
told about the courts’ role in protecting individual rights in the wake of 
September 11, much as one can tell competing stories about the courts’ 
rights-protective role more generally.280  Yet evidence from the past eight 
years offers some reason to think that the courts will intervene in cases in 
which the executive national security policies intrude particularly strongly 
on individual rights.281  More systemically, the observer effect reminds the 
executive of the courts’ presence, and so has a subtle rights-protective 
influence on a number of executive policies in the wake of a triggering 
event. 
The observer effect tends to work without regard to the subject matter of 
the specific case or cases on which a court is focused.  But that fact might 
leave categories of individual plaintiffs out in the cold in case after case.  
Assume the courts are aware of and seek to foster the observer effect in the 
executive.  If the courts decide not to defer only in cases that do not 
implicate individual rights, and decide to defer in national security cases 
 
 278. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–36 (2004). 
 279. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT:  HOW THE CHOICE OF 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 20 (1985) (“Even when the Congress and 
the President can be counted upon to defend most of us from the infringement of 
fundamental liberties, because the political majorities to which those departments of 
government answer demand such protection, the Supreme Court often stands alone as the 
guardian of minority groups. . . .  True, the Supreme Court’s record in championing the 
cause of oppressed minorities is hardly unstained.”). 
 280. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Has the Hour of Democracy Come Round at Last?  
The New Critique of Judicial Review, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 683, 685 (2000) (reviewing 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
(1999), and MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000)) 
(“[The Supreme] Court appears to be retreating from its role as stalwart defender of 
constitutional rights.”); see also, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 1 (describing courts’ general 
passivity in the face of controversial governmental policies affecting individual rights). 
 281. See, e.g, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557 (2005); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507; Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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that do implicate individual rights, the courts might preserve the observer 
effect while failing to serve their function as individual rights protectors.  
We might conclude that the observer effect will have some influence in 
shifting national security policies that do implicate individual rights, but 
those changes might be more modest and less satisfying from a rights-
protective approach than they would be if the cases on which the courts did 
not defer were individual rights cases.  In short, the observer effect 
produces a better “second-best” world when the cases in which the courts 
show less deference are those that implicate individual rights. 
A more abstract and systemic separation-of-powers goal is to avoid an 
excessive concentration of power in any particular institution of 
government.  Scholars such as Posner and Vermeule are untroubled by the 
quantum of power that today’s executive branch has accrued to itself.  They 
see it as inevitable that the executive will dominate today’s government, 
and they perceive the executive as being restrained primarily by political 
rather than, say, judicial forces.  Others decry deference precisely because it 
facilitates this accretion of power in the executive.282 
Yet the implications of deferential and nondeferential judicial decisions 
in the national security context are not completely intuitive.  A 
nondeferential court decision achieves more separation of powers “balance” 
than may be apparent at first glance.  That is because, as Part I showed, the 
court’s involvement casts a shadow longer than the individual court 
decision that struck down or modified an executive policy.  Conversely, the 
observer effect allows courts in many cases to take more modest approaches 
to executive national security policies because the executive has reduced—
under its own steam—its claims of authority.  The executive has, in other 
words, voluntarily surrendered some of its accreted power, a fact that 
contributes to the structural balance among branches. 
3.  Democratic Accountability 
Another goal in separating powers—and in placing all of the power to 
execute the laws in a single entity—is to promote the accountability of the 
decisionmakers to the people they represent.283  Those who favor national 
security deference emphasize that the president (and Congress, when it 
chooses to get involved in national security decisions) are far more 
politically accountable to the people than the courts.  The executive in 
particular is best positioned to make the difficult decisions that protect 
individuals from or expose individuals to danger during times of crises.  At 
 
 282. Cole, supra note 151, at 1332–33 (“Democracies are good for many things, but they 
are not good at distributing costs fairly when there are easy ways to concentrate them on 
minorities.  If the Constitution is designed to forestall such responses, and if such responses 
are more likely in emergencies, then it is critical that the judiciary, the least democratic 
branch, maintain an active role in enforcing our constitutional commitments during 
emergency periods.”). 
 283. Flaherty, supra note 38, at 1740, 1767 (noting that separation of powers helped cabin 
unfettered populism by recasting accountability to render it “more truly representative, or at 
least representative of the people’s better, more deliberative selves”). 
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the same time, the public may and will hold the president accountable for 
those decisions.  Courts are less directly accountable to the people, and, 
according to this argument, should therefore tread carefully when 
invalidating executive policies established to protect the citizenry. 
Courts are sensitive to the reputational costs of deciding controversial 
cases—and cases involving wartime or emergency policies are particularly 
likely to be controversial.  Many scholars have highlighted the institutional 
costs of deciding such cases.284  Judicial decisions on the merits force 
courts to bear certain reputational costs.  The operation of the observer 
effect means that courts need to decide fewer such cases (or decide them in 
a more modest manner) than they may think in order to preserve separation-
of-powers values.  This approach allows courts largely (though not entirely) 
to avoid making politically controversial decisions that might cast questions 
on their institutional competence, while allowing the courts on limited 
occasions to stake out their more popular role as defender of rights.285  At 
the same time, there are ways in which courts can distance themselves from 
the policies in question, thus ensuring that political accountability for the 
policy falls squarely on the executive. 
IV.  REVISITING NATIONAL SECURITY DEFERENCE 
The fundamental requirements of the observer effect—occasional 
threatened or actual judicial interventions in national security cases and 
ongoing uncertainty about jurisdiction and substantive rules—already exist 
today.  However, it is not clear that the executive, Congress, the courts, or 
litigants are conscious of the effect or attempt to use it in a tailored, 
deliberate way.286  Yet Part III shows how the observer effect, when fully 
operational, allows the executive and the courts to maintain a healthy 
constitutional balance.  This Part offers some lessons for the relevant 
institutions as they seek to achieve and preserve (or pressure the other 
branches to preserve) that balance. 
A.  Lessons for Courts 
One purpose of identifying and specifying the observer effect is to enable 
courts to better understand the effect that their deferential and 
nondeferential decisions have on executive branch policymaking.  This 
 
 284. BICKEL, supra note 190; Katyal, supra note 163; see also Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that it would have been 
better for the court to decline to review such actions than to have the judiciary review and 
approve them). 
 285. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 241, at 19 (arguing that a court can protect itself as an 
institution by upholding largely popular policies but not foregoing the right to say what the 
law is); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 243, at 1144 (“In the area of foreign affairs and 
national security, where interpretations are often based upon sensitive political calculations, 
the Justices usually see themselves at an institutional disadvantage in comparison to the 
executive branch.”). 
 286. For reasons of space, Part IV does not discuss ways in which litigants may employ 
(and feel the impact of) the observer effect.  Nevertheless, understanding the observer effect 
clearly will be to litigants’ advantage. 
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section summarizes ways in which courts may employ the observer effect to 
achieve particular ends. 
1.  Preserving Uncertainty 
Perhaps the most important lesson for courts is that, for the observer 
effect to function, their decisions and communications must create 
uncertainty in the executive branch about when and how the courts might 
intervene to review future policies.  This proposition is in some tension with 
frequent calls in favor of predictability in the legal system.287  It also is in 
tension with the idea that a decisionmaker (in this case, the executive 
branch) tends to make better decisions when armed with more (relevant) 
information.  As Adrian Vermeule has written, 
Minimalist decisions leave things undecided, which itself imposes a cost 
on all actors in the legal system . . . .  [T]he option value of leaving things 
undecided, and the reduced error costs that arise from postponing high-
stakes decisions until more information is available, might indeed be good 
for courts during emergencies, but what is good for courts might be bad 
for the system overall.288 
As Parts I and II illustrated, the type of uncertainty that arises in the wake 
of triggering events can benefit not only the courts but our separation-of-
powers system generally during times of crisis. 
Conversely, if a series of court decisions harmonizes the law and does so 
in favor of executive authority, the observer effect will wane.  The 
uncertainty that is critical for retaining the observer effect dissipates, 
diminishing the impetus for the executive to keep adjusting its policies.  
The D.C. Circuit’s habeas jurisprudence serves as an example.  Other than 
the 2011 Executive Order establishing periodic high-level reviews of 
Guantánamo detentions, the executive does not appear to have made any 
fine-grained policy shifts on Guantánamo detention processes since the 
D.C. Circuit began systematically to uphold the executive’s policies.  But if 
there are important advantages to be gained when the executive consistently 
revisits its security policies and, in doing so, challenges itself about whether 
it has struck the correct balance between security and liberty, then courts 
may wish to foster strategic uncertainty in the executive. 
This proposal raises two difficult questions.  First, is it appropriate for a 
court to adopt views on executive security policies (either individually or in 
the aggregate) before a particular case or controversy about those policies 
comes before it?  This is a legitimate concern; after all, it is first and 
foremost the role of the electorate to decide whether the government has 
struck an appealing overall balance in its security policies.  Yet empirical 
 
 287. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1179–83 (1989) (describing the virtues of clear, predictable rules); David Super, Against 
Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1405 n.120 (2011) (noting that arguments in favor of 
rule-based decisionmaking traditionally focus on a rule’s ability “to foster the interrelated 
virtues of reliance, predictability, and certainty”). 
 288. Vermeule, supra note 15, at 14. 
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scholarship has shown that judges have policy preferences, and manipulate 
judicial review to accommodate those preferences.289  Additionally, the 
Supreme Court recently has evidenced a willingness to intervene in cases to 
“assert and preserve the institutional role of the federal courts,”290 which 
implicitly reflects an interest in ensuring that another branch—here, the 
executive—cannot accrete too much unchecked power.  If courts 
understand the operation of the observer effect to mean that sustaining some 
uncertainty in the executive branch serves as a check on aggressive power 
grabs, they have incentives to foster that uncertainty, whether or not it is 
wholly appropriate for them to do so. 
Second, is it possible, particularly in the long term, for courts to maintain 
such uncertainty while upholding their judicial obligations?  The 
Guantánamo habeas corpus litigation in the D.C. Circuit illustrates how, 
over two years, serial cases evinced new principles of law—as to 
admissible evidence, standards of proof, and substantive detainability—that 
became established precedent as they reappeared in different district courts 
and, eventually, in the court of appeals.  In situations such as this, it is hard 
to see how the relevant courts could both follow this precedent and sustain 
executive uncertainty.  This further highlights the temporal ebb-and-flow 
nature of the observer effect.  But serial cases such as these are the 
exception, not the norm, and in the ordinary course there are likely to be 
multiple opportunities for courts to introduce uncertainty into the 
executive’s assessment of its own policy positions. 
2.  Framing Deference 
A second key lesson is that not all deference is created equal.  Courts 
therefore should be attuned to the form in which they manifest deference to 
the executive.  An unambiguous decision on the merits that upholds a U.S. 
national security policy on the basis of deference to the executive is the 
purest form of deference.  A decision like this likely will lead the executive 
to consider its policy in that area secure from challenge for at least several 
years.  Deference that takes the form of a denial of certiorari or hesitant 
reliance on the political question doctrine is deference, to be sure, but it 
comes in a form that leaves the executive far less confident about the 
security of its policies.  The latter is much more likely to lead to moderating 
shifts in executive policy than the former unambiguous decision.  In 
addition, when courts defer, they often have opportunities to clarify that 
their deference does not represent an endorsement of the executive’s 
position on the merits.291  Courts also may defer in fact but choose to say 
 
 289. Tracey E. George & Albert E. Yoon, Chief Judges:  The Limits of Attitudinal Theory 
and Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (“Attitudinal 
theory proffers that judges are political actors who make decisions that will maximize their 
policy preferences.”). 
 290. Vladeck, supra note 1, at 125. 
 291. Katyal, supra note 163, at 1712 (noting that courts can make clear that a decision not 
to hear a case because of a procedural bar is not an endorsement of the constitutionality of 
the executive’s act). 
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little or nothing about deference in their opinions.  These kinds of 
approaches can further amplify the observer effect. 
3.  Acknowledging Executive Modifications 
Courts are not obligated to defer to revised executive policies crafted 
pursuant to the observer effect beyond what precedent may require.  Indeed, 
in some cases they may not know that the policy at issue has evolved from 
an earlier, more aggressive form.  But if courts never acknowledge that the 
executive has made beneficial policy changes in these circumstances, the 
executive may conclude that the incentives to respond to the observer effect 
are low and thus may decide more often to gamble in court with their more 
aggressive, unaltered policies.  Courts therefore may wish to be attuned to 
executive policy shifts when evaluating close cases, at least where those 
courts are persuaded that the original policy was adopted as a good faith 
interpretation of what the law allowed.292 
4.  Selecting Triggering Cases 
A judicial decision on a particular national security question has ripple 
effects that extend well beyond the specific policy at issue.  But the 
observer effect operates as a relatively blunt instrument:  having decided to 
adjudicate a particular national security case on the merits, the court will 
have little ability to forecast (and limited means to control) how its decision 
will affect other executive policies.293  At the same time, in the national 
security context, courts have a fair measure of discretion to decide which 
particular cases to adjudicate on the merits.  So how should a court decide 
which cases to take up on the merits?294 
If a court wishes to magnify the observer effect, it should consider the 
presence of the factors described in Part II.B.  Those factors include the 
likelihood of multiple related cases in the foreseeable future, a high level of 
public attention to the executive policies being challenged, the existence of 
interagency disputes about the propriety of the existing policy, and 
 
 292. The court in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Jeppesen II), 614 F.3d 1070, 
1090 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), seems to have taken this approach. 
 293. The part of the Hamdan decision that held that Common Article 3 applied to the 
U.S. conflict with al Qaeda is a good example.  That holding had implications beyond 
military commissions:  it altered the law applicable to all U.S. detainees in the conflict with 
al Qaeda, and it led the Department of Defense to modify the rules governing interrogations. 
See DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 2-22.3, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR 
OPERATIONS (2006). 
 294. In advancing their theory that law represents an equilibrium among competing 
branches of government, Eskridge and Frickey note that the most difficult question their 
theory confronts is when the Court should disrupt a national equilibrium.  They conclude, as 
a descriptive matter, “Only when the national political branches have failed to deliberate on 
the relevant constitutional values has the Court exercised its authority to disrupt the 
equilibrium.” Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 13, at 90.  While Congress’s support for the 
executive policies at issue—particularly as evidenced by statutory authorization—is relevant 
to how a court disposes of a national security case, this section suggests additional factors a 
court may wish to consider. 
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manageable transaction costs.  All things being equal, the presence of one 
or more of these factors associated with a particular executive policy 
suggests that a court intervention on that policy likely will have a tangible 
impact on other associated policies (and on the challenged policy itself 
during the pendency of litigation). 
Conversely, courts should be attuned to the total absence of an observer 
effect on the policy being litigated.  In an area of the law rife with 
deference, courts obviously retain a clear way to protect individual rights:  
hearing a case on the merits and striking down a government policy.  Where 
there is little external evidence that the executive intends to modify, on its 
own, a policy that imposes particularly strong restrictions on individual 
liberty, courts may wish to adopt a nondeferential posture in the case 
challenging that policy. 
B.  Lessons for the Executive 
The executive might take two lessons from a clearer understanding of the 
observer effect, one about how it presents its policies and one about how it 
signals a sensitivity to judicial concerns. 
First, as discussed in Part II, the process by, and format in, which the 
executive develops and announces its policies is likely to affect the extent 
to which courts will defer to those positions.  Therefore, in cases in which 
the executive is most anxious to avoid judicial review, it should consider 
carefully how it develops its processes, publicizes its reliance on experts, 
formalizes its policies, and announces those policies.  Further, the timing of 
the policy shift matters.  The executive is more likely to obtain deference if 
it announces its policy (or policy change) at a time that avoids implying that 
the policy shift is tied to pending cases.295 
As a related matter, the executive should ensure that its pre–observer 
effect policy reflects a legitimate interpretation of the law.  If the executive 
is a strategic actor (as this Article argues), one might be concerned that the 
executive—suspecting that it may come under pressure in the future to 
“soften” a national security policy—will select initial policies that are more 
aggressive than the executive ultimately believes it needs.  This would build 
in a “cushion” for the executive to shift its policies in a more rights-
protective direction, while still resulting in a policy with which it is very 
comfortable.  And if the courts are strategic actors (as this Article also 
argues), courts will be attuned to this possibility and be less inclined to 
defer to executive policies, even after policy shifts.  There are good reasons 
to think that the executive faces other (nonjudicial) pressures to craft 
sincere initial policies.  For instance, public outcry would be substantial if it 
became publicly known that the executive had selected an initial policy 
position that it internally believed was unlawful.  In any case, selecting 
 
 295. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 19, at 41 (noting that many modest self-imposed 
restrictions were particularly significant because the Obama Administration seemed to 
embrace them on its own initiative rather than under apparent threat of judicial scrutiny). 
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initial policies that are insincere (if detected) will significantly diminish 
courts’ willingness to defer to amended policies. 
Second, it may behoove the executive to signal to the courts that it is 
sensitive to judicial concerns as it sets or amends its policies.  The 
executive may benefit, for instance, by providing courts with greater details 
about the way in which concerns previously expressed by courts influenced 
the way it settled on particular policies.  This might include identifying 
various triggering cases that influenced the shape of subsequent policies.296  
In this way, the executive could signal to the courts that it developed a 
particular policy under the influence of the observer effect, which may 
affect the courts’ willingness to defer, at least in hard cases.  And when seen 
in this light, aggressive executive claims that “extraordinary deference” is 
warranted and that the courts’ role is “extremely circumscribed” seem 
counterproductive, because they virtually dare the courts to intervene, rather 
than signaling that they are sensitive to the institutional balance that 
undergirds the separation of powers.297 
C.  Lessons for Congress 
Congress can affect how the observer effect operates between the 
executive and the courts.298  Specifically, a congressional requirement that 
certain types of cases be filed in a particular circuit affects how the observer 
effect functions.  The direction in which the requirement pushes the 
observer effect is unpredictable, though, and depends on the substantive 
inclinations of the designated circuit.299 
On one hand, designating a circuit to handle a particular type of national 
security case eventually may diminish the observer effect.  The observer 
effect operates most effectively when courts generally uphold executive 
policies but occasionally decline to defer.  When a circuit hears a large 
volume of comparable cases, the rough edges of the case law become 
smoothed out as those courts resolve ambiguities.  In these circumstances, 
the executive is better able to anticipate outcomes.  In the short term, as the 
courts are moving toward an equilibrium, the executive has incentives to (or 
is forced by courts to) change its policies.  In the longer term, however, the 
settled nature of the case law creates few incentives for the executive to 
 
 296. A possible analogy here is to the “statement of reasons” given by agencies in the 
context of rulemaking.  See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
355, 398–99 (2012) (noting that providing reasoned analysis is the way that an agency “pays 
for (and warrants) deference” from courts). 
 297. Consider the U.S. government’s Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
and Motion To Dismiss or for Judgment As a Matter of Law and Memorandum in Support at 
7–8, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, No. 1:04-cv-01166-RJL (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 
2004), 2004 WL 5378102 (arguing that any role the courts have in reviewing the 
Commander-in-Chief’s exercise of his authority to determine the combatant status of 
detainees is “extremely circumscribed” and that the courts’ role in resolving detainee claims 
about status must be “extraordinarily deferential” and would, in some cases, “be proscribed 
altogether”). 
 298. Congress obviously has a role in that relationship if congressional authorization of 
executive acts causes courts to defer more.  See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 3. 
 299. Thanks to Kate Andrias for useful suggestions on this point. 
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make those changes.  This is particularly true where the circuit’s 
“equilibrium” is highly deferential to the government, as the D.C. Circuit’s 
has been in the detainee habeas cases.300  That said, settled case law and 
limited change to executive policies is not always a bad thing.  In the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), for instance, both courts 
and Congress have concluded that the low number of cases in which the 
FISC rejects government warrant applications results not from excessive 
deference from the FISC but from “a practice of careful compliance with 
the statutory requirements on the part of the government.”301  The observer 
effect supports this conclusion, particularly where the FISC remains willing 
on occasion to reject or amend a government warrant application. 
Forcing similar cases into a predetermined circuit with substantive 
proclivities different from the D.C. Circuit may enhance the observer effect 
to the breaking point.  Congress chooses to enact these types of 
jurisdictional statutes to let courts develop expertise in complicated but 
similar types of cases.  As courts gain confidence and experience in 
adjudicating these cases, these courts become more willing to second-guess 
executive claims that courts lack the institutional capacity and expertise to 
handle national security issues.302  If the designated circuit consistently 
takes a strongly nondeferential approach to executive policies, the executive 
has reduced incentives to make modest policy changes to fend off court 
involvement.  In such cases, the observer effect will wither away. 
This suggests that assigning cases by statute to a particular circuit or set 
of courts has significant disadvantages.  Congress should be attuned to the 
impact this has on the separation of powers in national security cases and, 
where it chooses to designate a circuit, should consider additional ways to 
ensure a suitable balance between court oversight and executive flexibility 
in policymaking. 
There are other ways in which Congress can weaken the observer effect 
as well.  When it enacts legislation that strips jurisdiction from courts, as it 
did in the Military Commissions Act of 2006,303 it effectively ensures that 
the observer effect will not operate (unless courts conclude that the 
statutory provision is unconstitutional).  Statutory bars to raising certain 
claims will produce the same effect.304  Likewise, if the Senate provides 
 
 300. Patrick Campbell, U.S. Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Khadr v. Obama, 
Guantánamo and Beyond:  A Blog on Executive Detention, National Security and Due 
Process, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N (May 27, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/
ExecutiveDetention/2011/05/the_supreme_court_denies_certi.html (“In connection with the 
D.C. Circuit’s rulings in favor of the Government, the D.C. Circuit, without any substantive 
Supreme Court decision since Boumediene, is developing burdens of proof and procedural 
and remedial rules applicable to detainee habeas petitions that frustrate and narrow the 
fundamental Constitutional [sic] rights Boumediene afforded detainees.”). 
 301. United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 302. See generally Chesney, supra note 227. 
 303. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 304. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g) (2006) (limiting the ability of military commission 
defendants to raise the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note 
(Treating Obligations Not Establishing Grounds for Certain Claims) (noting that individuals 
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advice and consent to ratification of a treaty subject to a declaration that the 
treaty is non-self-executing, that also will suppress the observer effect.  In 
short, foreclosing judicial review—by whatever mechanism—will diminish 
the likelihood that the observer effect will manifest itself and concomitantly 
reduce executive policy adjustments. 
CONCLUSION 
In her article on the substantive and procedural decisions taken by U.S. 
courts since September 11, Jenny Martinez recounts a question that Jose 
Padilla asked her:  “Why is it that litigation concerning the alleged enemy 
combatants detained at Guantanamo and elsewhere has been going on for 
more than six years and almost nothing seems to have actually been 
decided?”305  In one sense, the underlying premise of Padilla’s question 
remains true:  courts have decided only a limited number of substantive 
issues in the national security arena, notwithstanding the continuing 
proliferation of litigation.306 
In another sense, though, much of substance has been decided since 
2002—by the executive branch rather than the courts.  This Article 
illustrated an important reason why the executive’s national security 
policies have changed significantly since 2001.  Many of these changes are 
due not to the direct sunlight of court orders, but to the shadow cast by the 
threat or reality of court decisions on executive policymaking in related 
areas of activity.  Court decisions, particularly in the national security 
realm, have a wider ripple effect than many recognize because the executive 
has robust incentives to try to preserve security issues as its sole domain.  In 
areas where the observer effect shifts executive policies closer to where 
courts likely would uphold them, demands for deference by the executive 
turn out to be more modest than they might seem if considered from the 
isolated vantage of a single case at a fixed point in time.  It remains critical 
for courts to police the outer bounds of executive national security policies, 
but they need not engage systematically to have a powerful effect on the 
shape of those policies and, consequently, the constitutional national 
security order. 
A more detailed understanding of the observer effect has implications for 
national security developments on the horizon.  In particular, the observer 
effect should have salience for those in Congress and the executive branch 
who are considering whether to create a new national security court that 
would review targeted killings.307  In this type of situation, the executive 
 
are precluded from invoking the Geneva Conventions in habeas or other civil actions as a 
source of rights). 
 305. Martinez, supra note 3, at 1014–15. 
 306. Scheppele, supra note 3, at 94 (“[T]he solutions that judges have crafted—often 
bold, ambitious, and brave solutions—nonetheless fail to address the plights of the specific 
individuals who brought the cases.”). 
 307. See, e.g., Editorial, A Court for Targeted Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2013, at 
A26; Jeh Johnson, Pentagon Gen. Counsel, A “Drone Court”:  Some Pros and Cons, Mar. 
18, 2013, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/jeh-johnson-speech-on-a-drone-
court-some-pros-and-cons/. 
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would have no jurisdictional uncertainty but ample substantive uncertainty, 
at least initially.  This suggests that the observer effect might have a 
significant up-front effect on executive decisionmaking regarding targeted 
killings, shifting those decisions in a more rights-focused direction.  As 
long as the court periodically challenged executive petitions, whether by 
rejecting a given petition or requiring additional information before 
approving it, we could predict that the executive would continue to make 
modest adjustments to its policies.  Over time, as the court established 
baseline doctrine, that effect would flatten out, prompting fewer and fewer 
changes in executive policy, as with the Guantánamo habeas cases in the 
D.C. Circuit. 
This Article focused on the role of the observer effect in cases and 
policies related to national security.  But this is not the only area of law or 
legal relationship in which the phenomenon appears.  Instead, this Article 
analyzed the observer effect in the national security context both because 
the effect manifests itself prominently in this area and because it has 
important implications for the related national security deference debate.  
However, the hope is to provide insights about a phenomenon that appears 
in other areas of the law308 and to begin to shed light on how the 
phenomenon operates on a transsubstantive and transinstitutional level.309 
 
 308. A modified version of the observer effect may appear when Congress threatens 
legislation that would alter a particular executive policy.  This may prompt the executive to 
temper that policy itself, particularly where Congress may have sufficient votes to enact the 
legislation.  For example, Congress periodically has contemplated passing a law regulating 
the use of the state secrets privilege.  Attorney General Holder’s 2009 state secrets policy 
seems to have gone far enough to take the wind out of Congress’s sails. Charlie Savage, 
Justice Dept. Planning To Limit Government’s Use of State Secrets Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 23, 2009, at A16 (“Leading Democratic lawmakers in both the House and the Senate 
have filed bills that would restrict how the privilege could be used. . . .  [T]he new policy, 
which is intended to rein in use of the privilege by erecting greater internal checks and 
balances against abuse, could blunt momentum in Congress to pass legislation. . . .  
Generally, the administration’s proposed policy echoes those review requirements [proposed 
by Congress].”).  Similarly, in 1975 the Church Committee began to investigate the CIA’s 
use of assassinations.  Even before the Committee issued its recommendations, President 
Gerald Ford promulgated an Executive Order prohibiting the assassination of foreign 
officials. L. BRITT SNYDER, THE AGENCY AND THE HILL:  CIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH 
CONGRESS 277 (2008); Chesney, supra note 140, at 590 (noting that in the wake of the 
Church Committee recommendations Presidents Ford and Jimmy Carter “moved via 
executive order to impose voluntary substantive and procedural constraints on covert action, 
thereby deflating momentum in Congress for more permanent (and potentially more drastic) 
intervention”).  Another example arises in the use of secret evidence in immigration 
proceedings.  In the wake of several troubling, high-profile cases in which INS sought to 
deport individuals on the basis of secret evidence, several members of Congress introduced 
the Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 1999, H.R. 2121, 106th Cong. § 6.  The executive 
invoked changes to its internal policies as one reason to oppose the bill. See Secret Evidence 
Repeal Act of 1999:  Hearing of H.R. 2121 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra 
note 109. 
 309. Other cases in which interbranch interactions may reflect a modified observer effect 
are threats of presidential vetoes, which affect the content of legislation notwithstanding 
Congress’s pure preferences; and threats of congressional overrides, which impact the 
decisions courts produce. See Charles M. Cameron, The Presidential Veto, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 9, at 362 (presidential veto); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE 
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The observer effect sheds light on an even broader debate about the role 
of the executive in our separation-of-powers system.  There is a growing 
body of literature exploring the extent to which the executive today faces 
legal constraints on its actions, and an increasing interest in how nonlegal 
constraints on the executive function.310  One can view the observer effect 
either as a legal constraint (derived from a future prediction about where a 
court will decide the “law” should be) or as a quasi-legal constraint that 
nevertheless has a direct and real impact on executive national security 
decisions.311  In either case, the executive responds to the observer effect to 
maintain control over the content of its security policies, and to preempt 
judicial decisions with which it would feel pressure to comply.  By virtue of 
the observer effect, it is not true that the courts “come too late” to national 
security issues or that the executive governs “nearly alone.”312  Rather, the 
observer effect reveals one way courts exert a subtle, ongoing influence on 
the executive to constrain its own actions, even in national security, an area 
of law in which the executive usually is seen as most unbound. 
 
L.J. 331, 390–403 (1991) (congressional override of court decisions); Pablo T. Spiller & 
Emerson Tiller, Invitations To Override:  Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court 
Decisions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 503 (1996) (same). 
 310. See generally GOLDSMITH, supra note 19; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 10 
(claiming that the primary constraints on the executive are political, not legal); Huq, supra 
note 22 (arguing that the executive faces a combination of legal and political restraints); 
Pildes, supra note 22; Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 22. 
 311. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously viewed law as prediction, often a prediction about 
what the courts would say the common law is. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 
HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897). 
 312. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 19 (quoting Carl Schmitt, Die 
Rechstswissenschaft im Führerstaat, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT DER AKADEMI FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT 
438–39 (1935)) (arguing that during times of crises the rate of policy change is so fast that 
Congress and the courts are forced to hand the reins to the executive). 
